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EVOLUTION OF THE CORPORATE FORM IN INDONESIA: 
AN EXPLORATION OF LEGAL INNOVATION AND STAGNATION  
 
Petra Mahy∗ 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines in detail the long historical evolution of the company form and company 
law in Indonesia from the colonial period through to the present. The paper engages with 
existing research on the evolution of corporate law and explanations for the differences 
between patterns of legal innovation in origin and transplant countries. This research finds 
some ‘legal origins’ effects in the ways that Indonesian company law has developed, but that 
patterns of change have been significantly different to that of its former coloniser, the 
Netherlands. Other mechanisms of continuity and change are observed including the impacts 
of ‘colonial legal history’ and of informal modes of business regulation.  
 
1. Introduction 
  
Discussion of the historical development of company law in Indonesia almost inevitably 
remarks on the fact that the law remained unaltered for almost 150 years after the corporate 
form was first introduced by the Dutch Commercial Code in 1848.1 The scant 21 articles in 
the Commercial Code that enabled and lightly regulated the limited liability company, 
together with the largely ignored 1939 ordinance which established an indigenous joint stock 
company, survived until 1995 when a new and far more detailed company law was finally 
introduced. Some amendments to the company law were most recently made in 2007. 
Indonesia also now has a non-mandatory Code of Good Corporate Governance which was 
first introduced in 1999 and has since been amended a couple of times. Indonesia has thus 
undergone comparatively little innovation over time in its formal company law.2  
                                                 
∗ Dr Petra Mahy is a Research Fellow in the Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash University, 
Australia. This paper forms a part of a larger research project studying the comparative development of labour 
law and company law in the Asia-Pacific region: Australian Research Council Discovery Project (DP1095060) 
titled ‘Legal Origins: The Impact of Different Legal Systems on the Regulation of the Business Enterprise in the 
Asia-Pacific Region’. The Chief Investigators on the project are Professor Richard Mitchell (Monash 
University), and Professor Ian Ramsay, Associate Professor Sean Cooney and Professor Peter Gahan (The 
University of Melbourne). I additionally thank Andrew Rosser and Matthijs de Jongh for assistance with sources, 
and Benny Tabalujan and David Linnan for advice. Any errors are the responsibility of the author.  
1 See, e.g., BENNY TABALUJAN, INDONESIAN COMPANY LAW: A TRANSLATION AND 
COMMENTARY 18 (1997); Sudargo Gautama, Recent Developments Concerning Investment in Indonesia 
(with Special Reference to the New Company Law 1995), 1 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 117, 130 (1997); 
RACHMADI USMAN, DIMENSI HUKUM PERUSAHAAN PERSEROAN TERBATAS [DIMENSIONS OF 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LAW] 2 (2004).  
2 For comparison, see the countries covered in: Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark 
D. West, Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON L. 791 (2002) 
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There has been increased interest in the last decade and a half in trying to understand 
different patterns in company law around the world and explaining how this diversity has 
developed. There has also been additional interest in the character of company law and its 
effects in Asia since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98, which was largely attributed to 
poor corporate governance in that region, including in Indonesia.3 Some provocative and 
influential research in the late 1990s contended that the particular family that a legal system 
belongs to, that is whether it is of common law or civil law origin, has long-term effects on 
the development of company law. 4 This ‘legal origins’ argument, based on comparative 
quantitative measures of legal protection of minority shareholders, concluded that common 
law countries have higher levels of shareholder protection which encourages investment and 
in turn results in greater market capitalisation. This research has inspired further comparative 
quantitative studies of corporate law,5 as well as a great deal of critical responses based 
around arguments that politics, economics, culture and colonial histories play important roles 
in determining the path of company law development in particular jurisdictions, and may 
override any legal origins effects.6     
 
The legal origins argument was based on quantitative ‘point in time’ methodology which 
made assumptions about historical trajectories (path dependencies) of legal development, and 
raised interest in tracing continuity and change in company law style and substance through 
                                                                                                                                                        
[hereinafter Pistor et al.]; and in the related work: Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & 
Mark D. West, Innovation in Corporate Law, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 676 (2003). All the countries studied by 
Pistor et al. (France, Germany, UK, US, Spain, Chile, Columbia, Japan, Israel and Malaysia) have had statutory 
rates of change over time greater than Indonesia.   
3 For examples of post-Asian Financial Crisis studies of corporate governance in Asia, see: Simon Johnson, 
Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach & Eric Friedman, Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. FIN. 
ECON. 141 (2000); Demetra Arsalidou & Margaret Wang, Difficulties with Enforcing Western Standards of 
Corporate Governance in Asia, 16 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 329 (2005); Stijn Claessens & Joseph P.H. Fan, 
Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey, 3 INT’L REV. FIN. 71 (2002); CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND FINANCE IN EAST ASIA: A STUDY OF INDONESIA, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, MALAYSIA, 
PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND (Juzhong Zhuang et al. eds., 2001). 
4 The ‘legal origins’ hypothesis originated with the work of La Porta et al. See, Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN 
1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and 
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).   
5 See, e.g., John Armour, Simon Deakin, Priya Lele & Mathias Siems, How do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence 
from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 579;  
Helen Anderson, Michelle Welsh, Ian Ramsay & Peter Gahan, The Evolution of Shareholder and Creditor 
Protection in Australia: An International Comparison, 61 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 171 (2012).  
6 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics and Modern Stock Markets,120 HARV. L. REV. 460 (2007); 
John W. Cioffi, Legal Regimes and Political Particularism: An Assessment of the “Legal Families” Theory 
from the Perspectives of Comparative Law and Political Economy, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1501 (2009).  See 
further the original authors’ response to criticisms of the legal origins theory: Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-
de-Silanes & Andrei Schleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008). 
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time. Some leading research in this area is by Katharina Pistor and colleagues (2002, 2003).7 
This study examined the evolution of corporate law in four origin and six transplant countries 
from the time of its introduction through to the early 2000s. It used a set of open-ended legal 
indicators covering core areas of corporate law including existence of the company, 
governance structures and corporate finance. The study was based on an analysis of 
developments in statutory law. The selected countries of ‘origin’ in the study, that is, 
countries representative of ‘the most influential legal systems in the world’,8 were France, 
Germany, England and the United States. 9  The remaining six countries studied; Chile, 
Columbia, Israel, Japan, Malaysia and Spain, were selected as representatives of countries 
which had received their corporate laws either directly or indirectly from one of the origin 
countries.10 
Pistor et al. observed distinctly different patterns of statutory company law change between 
the origin and transplant countries. Their discussion begins with the early evolution of the 
conditions of entry (corporate existence) in the four origin countries. The important initial 
role of the state to control entry and to grant limited liability to companies was noted. The 
discussion then observed that with the gradual relinquishing of the state’s role, ‘key control 
rights’ concerning the existence of the corporate form, its governance and its finance 
arrangements in some countries shifted to corporate controllers. It was noted that in England, 
control across all three categories of corporate law indicators lay predominantly with 
shareholders, whereas in the US most control was vested in the directors of the corporate 
body. In the two continental European countries, Germany and France, control rights 
continued to be determined more by legal prescription.   
 
How these ‘control rights’ were allocated in each system had ‘implications for the flexibility 
of the corporation to be able to respond to a changing environment’.11 In jurisdictions where 
control rights were mandatorily allocated, as occurred in the civil law jurisdictions, fewer 
legal innovations were observed. In the more flexible systems of the common law countries, 
                                                 
7 Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law, supra note 2; Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan 
Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six 
Countries, 18 WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 89 (2003). A related work is Pistor et al., Innovation 
in Corporate Law, supra note 2.  
8 Pistor et al., supra note 2, at 794.  
9 Pistor et al. treat the US as an origin country because, although it received its legal system as a transplant from 
England, since the late eighteenth century it has developed sufficiently independently to classify it as an origin 
jurisdiction.  
10 Pistor et al., supra note 2, at 794. 
11 Id., at 829.  
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particularly where control resided with management, complementary governance devices 
tended to emerge to protect shareholders, including ‘exit rights’, judicial protection and 
securities regulation. The degree of flexibility of a system, Pistor et al. argue, offers a more 
robust explanation for the superior economic performance of common law countries 
compared to civil law countries than those arguments that place emphasis on the differences 
in rules of minority shareholder protection. In other words, they contend that ‘good’ company 
law is that which displays a comparatively high rate of incremental innovation over time.   
 
Pistor et al. then demonstrate that transplant countries show quite different patterns of legal 
development from those of origin countries. In other words, notwithstanding the implications 
of some of the work grounded in legal origins, the authors’ argument is that even within 
similar legal families, the evolution of corporate law in transplant countries will not 
necessarily follow the same path as that of its relevant country of origin. 12 The path of 
company law evolution may be affected by its legal reception in the borrowing country, and 
the responses of various actors including law makers, legal agents and the law’s ultimate 
users.13 How this process unfolds, how the participants learn to deal with the new law, and 
the extent to which they develop institutions which are complementary to it, may all impact 
upon the law’s adaptability to its environment.  
Pistor et al. find that while there are some features of legal origins which have influenced the 
evolution of corporate law in the six transplant countries (for example, the initial legal 
conditions established for the creation of corporate entities and some legal family-based 
differences in the degree of flexibility in the law), overall those countries have tended to 
follow their own, different, trajectories of development. They observed two distinct patterns 
in transplant countries. Firstly, some, such as Israel, Malaysia and Japan, displayed lengthy 
periods of legal ‘lethargy’ or ‘stagnation’ despite substantial economic developments. The 
authors suggest this pattern is due to formal law being unresponsive to political and economic 
change and to a process of creative destruction and reinvention of corporate law having not 
taken hold. The second pattern observed is ‘erratic change’, where, in countries such as Spain 
and Columbia, the law was to some extent responsive to socio-economic changes but bold 
rather than incremental moves often led to unintended consequences and further reactionary 
laws. Further, due to this lack of adaptation in corporate law in transplant countries, in 
                                                 
12 Pistor et al., supra note 2, at 797. 
13 Id. 
5 
 
general terms they correspondingly have had little recourse to the set of alternative control 
devices which have evolved in the US and England as complements to managerially-
controlled corporate flexibility.14 Overall, the authors conclude that legal transplants ‘cast a 
long shadow on legal institutions’,15 although they note that some of the transplant countries 
have recently shown some signs of developing independent processes of adaption in their 
corporate laws.  
 
Pistor et al.’s framework thus predicts that formal company law in transplant countries will 
either stagnate or experience erratic change particularly in earlier periods of its development, 
and that rates of innovation will have greater impact on the character of the law compared to 
any residual influence of ‘legal origin’. Although Pistor et al.’s insights have been influential, 
it appears that there have not been any directly inspired historical studies of company law in 
other jurisdictions based on their framework.16 There is a need for more empirical evidence 
relating to Pistor et al.’s framework and to the variety of mechanisms through which 
transplant systems may borrow and modify their corporate laws.17  
 
This paper aims to test Pistor et al.’s propositions in relation to Indonesia. Firstly, this paper 
presents a law-centred account of the long historical evolution of the corporate form in 
Indonesia within its economic and political history context, and where possible, it also 
provides a description of the outcomes of the various laws and how they have been used. It 
aims to uncover reasons for the pathway(s) that Indonesian company law has taken and in 
particular how it has come to have so few formal law changes. The paper generally adopts the 
methodology and insights of Pistor et al., but includes much more detail in this one country 
study than is employed in their comparative work. It extends the analysis to some factors that 
                                                 
14 Id., at 858-859. 
15 Pistor et al., Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect, supra note 7, at 94.  
16 Works that have noted with approval Pistor et al.’s insights regarding company law change include:  Randall 
Morck & Lloyd Steier, The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction, in A HISTORY OF 
COPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO 
PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS (Randall Morck ed., 2005); JOHN S. GILLESPIE, TRANSPLANTING 
COMMERCIAL LAW REFORM: DEVELOPING A ‘RULE OF LAW’ IN VIETNAM (2006); Mathias M. 
Siems, Shareholder Protection Around the World (Leximetric II), 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111 (2008); Afra 
Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from the Indian Experience, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 335 (2009); F. A. Gevurtz, The Globalization of Corporate Law: The End of History or a Never-Ending 
Story? 86 WASH. L. REV. 475 (2011). 
17 Simon Deakin, Legal Origin, Juridical Form, and Industrialisation in Historical Perspective: The Case of the 
Employment Contract and the Joint Stock Company, 7 SOC.-ECON. REV. 35, 52-53 (2009). See also ROB 
McQUEEN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF COMPANY LAW: GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AUSTRALIAN 
COLONIES 1854-1920 14 (2009) (noting that there are few historical studies of the dispersal of the limited 
liability corporate form around the world as it occurred through colonisation or through trading links with 
imperial powers).   
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fall outside their identified core areas of formal corporate law and to informal mechanisms of 
business regulation. The paper finds that the evolution of formal company law in Indonesia 
largely fits the first of the two patterns of company law development in transplant countries 
observed by Pistor et al., that is, it has displayed a remarkably long period of legal stagnation.   
 
Indonesia may be very broadly classified as belonging to the French civil law family, but this 
is complicated by a number of factors. The foundations for Indonesia’s legal system were laid 
down during the colonial era when many Dutch laws and concepts were imported. However, 
many elements of Indonesia’s legal system inherited from the Netherlands Indies did not 
correspond directly with the system in the Netherlands.18 In particular, the race-based plural 
legal system instituted by the Dutch colonial regime had repercussions over a lengthy period 
of time. Adat (customary law and practices) and Islamic law continued to apply to large 
sections of the population in certain private law matters. Classifying Indonesia as a civil law 
heritage country has been further complicated by some more recent transplants of common 
law-type concepts and practices such as the appointment of non-career (ad hoc) judges and 
allowance of dissenting judgements in the newly established specialist courts.19 
 
Indonesia received its original company law as a direct copy of the Dutch Commercial Code 
and since then has clearly experienced a very long period of legal stagnation with only 
relatively recent evidence of a greater level of adaptability to varying political and economic 
circumstances. Indonesia’s formal company law has not tended to follow the pattern of 
change undertaken in the Netherlands, although there are still discernible vestiges of its 
Dutch inheritance including a tendency towards mandatory regulation rather than allowance 
of flexibility. Although, as noted above, the case of Indonesia broadly fits the pattern 
observed by Pistor et al., the more detailed historical approach used in this paper reveals a 
number of critically important additional aspects to its formal company law development. 
These include the consequences of the long process of dismantling the inherited race-based 
plural legal system, the roles that political and economic ideologies have played in decisions 
about company law reform, competing emphasis placed on reform of the laws regulating 
                                                 
18 See Daniel Lev, Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian State, 40 INDONESIA 57 (2000).  
(demonstrating that what Indonesia inherited was ‘Dutch colonial law’ and not just ‘Dutch law’ with particular 
reference to the plural legal system).  
19 See Gary F. Bell, Indonesia: The Challenges of Legal Diversity and Law Reform, in LAW AND LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS OF ASIA: TRADITIONS, ADAPTATIONS AND INNOVATIONS 262 (E. Ann Black & 
Gary F. Bell eds., 2011) (giving a general account of the plural legal system in Indonesia and the recent 
introduction of specialist courts).  
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cooperatives and state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and aspirational nation-building aspects of 
Indonesia’s company law. The case of Indonesia suggests that Pistor et al.’s dual 
categorisation of ‘origin’ and ‘transplant’ countries is too general. Understandings of patterns 
of company law development in ‘transplant’ countries should be refined to take account of 
post-colonial and developing economy status. The effects of colonial legal history as well as 
‘legal family’ may be highly determinative of company law development. Company law may 
play other roles in such countries beyond enabling the corporate form and allocating control 
rights, and there may be additional factors, other than the original transplant, which impact on 
company law development through time.   
 
The paper then moves a further step beyond Pistor et al.’s focus on statutory law by paying 
particular attention to the wide gap between law and practice in Indonesia and the 
development of some ‘autonomous’ forms of business enterprise outside formal legislation. 
This additional analysis further highlights the non-regulatory roles that company law has 
played in Indonesia and allows discussion of the relationship between formal law and more 
informal modes of business regulation. While Indonesia’s formal company law experienced 
such a long period of stagnation, other informal mechanisms arose independently to fill at 
least part of the regulatory vacuum. That is, innovation was occurring outside the formal law. 
The case of Indonesia suggests, therefore, that informal modes of business regulation should 
also be carefully considered in historical approaches to company law development, 
particularly in developing countries where formal law may play lesser roles than in developed 
economies. This supports the argument made above that more nuanced understandings of 
‘transplant’ countries as a category in relation to company law change is needed in order to 
take account of the varying roles for both formal law and informal regulation in 
postcolonial/developing countries.  
 
2. The Historical Evolution of Company Law in Indonesia  
 
The Indonesian archipelago’s interaction with Dutch colonial powers began with the arrival 
of a company – one of the first great limited liability companies in the world. The United 
Dutch East India Company (VOC) traded in the Indonesian islands from 1602 to 1796 and 
eventually muscled out English and Portuguese competitors for the trade in spices and other 
products. The VOC’s primary aims were pioneering trade networks and the security of its 
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trading posts. It originally adapted to the existing political and economic system and simply 
creamed off levies and tributes from the top of local hierarchies, but over time it established a 
legal and administrative regime that supported its trade monopolies. Private enterprise by 
VOC merchants was forbidden, although corrupt officials carried on lively side businesses.20 
The VOC was disbanded due to bankruptcy in 1799 and its role in the Indies was assumed by 
the Dutch Government, which eventually imposed colonial government on most parts of the 
Indonesian archipelago, although its influence in some areas outside Java was weak. Save for 
a short period of British governance (1811–1816), the Dutch retained control up until the 
Japanese occupation during World War II. Indonesian nationalists declared Independence in 
August 1945 as soon as the Japanese departed, and after eventually winning the War of 
Independence against the returning Dutch forces, Indonesia became a fully independent state 
in 1949. 
2.1 The Dutch Commercial Code, 1848 
 
The first company law to have effect in the Netherlands Indies was the Dutch Commercial 
Code.21 It came into force on 1 May 1848 together with a suite of other new legislation 
including the Dutch Civil Code and General Provisions on Legislation that established the 
race-based pluralist legal system in the colony.22 Redrafted Napoleonic Codes had come into 
force in the Netherlands in August 1838.23 The Concordance Principle generally presumed 
that Netherlands law would be extended to its colonies, and a commission was appointed in 
1839 to plan for the introduction of the Civil and Commercial Codes to the Netherlands 
Indies. However, one important question to be decided was the position of adat (customary 
law) under the proposed introduction. European merchants argued that the new legislation 
should apply to the indigenous population as this would improve legal certainty and promote 
business expansion. In the end, the argument that extending European law to the indigenous 
population might lead to discontent or revolt won out, and the Commercial and Civil Codes 
                                                 
20 Justus M. van der Kroef, Colonial Continuity in Indonesia’s Economic Policy, 14 AUSTL. OUTLOOK 5, 6 
(1960).  
21 In the Dutch this is the Wetboek van Koophandel. It was directly accepted in the Netherlands Indies via 
Staatsblad no. 23/1847.   
22 JOHN BALL, INDONESIAN LEGAL HISTORY 1602-1848 223 (1982).  
23 E. J. J. VAN HEIJDEN & W.C.L.VAN DER GRINTEN, HANDBOEK VAN DER NAAMLOOZE 
VENNOOTSCHAP NAAR NEDERLANDSCH RECHT [HANDBOOK OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANY IN NETHERLANDS LAW] 10-14 (1946). Despite earlier drafts that attempted to make the Codes 
more ‘Dutch’ in orientation, the Codes of 1838 were quite consistent with their Napoleonic predecessors. Hence, 
the Dutch Commercial Code of 1838 was essentially a French origin transplant. See: R.C.H. Lesaffer, A Short 
Legal History of the Netherlands, in UNDERSTANDING DUTCH LAW 31, 57 (H.S. Taekema ed., 2004).  
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were only applied to Europeans in the colony. Adat law, in all its variations across ethnic 
groups, was to continue to be valid for all indigenous private law matters.24 Later changes 
were to bring Chinese and other ‘Foreign Orientals’ under the European Codes.  
 
The Commercial Code contained a sparse 21 articles (arts. 36–56) relating to the limited 
liability company (Naamloze Vennootschap (NV)).25 These articles set out requirements for 
government permission for incorporation, established the division of corporate capital into 
shares and provided that the company should specify a limited lifespan with the possibility of 
extension. The Code provided that the company would be managed by directors, with or 
without the oversight of a Board of Commissioners, and provided that directors would not be 
personally liable to third parties for company contracts. Directors were required to produce 
annual reports and report if a loss was made of more than 50% of the capital. If a loss of more 
than 75% of the capital occurred then the company was to be automatically dissolved. 
Shareholders were limited to six votes at general meetings in companies with 100 or more 
shares or to three votes in companies with fewer than 100 shares. The Code contained little 
else beyond these basic principles and hence only intervened in company governance in a 
confined set of circumstances. This generally accords with Pistor et al.’s observation that 
original company laws, in both civil and common law jurisdictions, were merely enabling 
with little further regulation.26  
 
The Commercial Code was introduced in the Netherlands Indies during the Cultuurstelsel or 
Cultivation System period and hence there was little immediate impact in terms of formation 
                                                 
24 BALL, supra note 22, at 197-207. See CARL-BERND KAEHLIG, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT IN 
INDONESIEN: AUTONOME UND NATIONALE GESELLSCHAFTSFORMEN [COMPANY LAW IN 
INDONESIA: AUTONOMOUS AND NATIONAL COMPANY FORMS] 277 (1986) (describes Aceh, Bugis 
and Minang adat business forms and finds that they were mainly characterised by product and profit sharing, an 
absence of company assets, limited duration and often with one active and one or more passive partners). Dutch 
commentators tended to dismiss those adat forms as being inadequate in how they dealt with the issue of legal 
personality, see, e.g., Jb. Zeylemaker Jzn, Indlandsche Rechtspersonen [Native Legal Persons], 23 
KOLONIALE STUDIEËN 207 (1939).  
25 In addition to the limited liability company a number of other business forms were made available (at the time 
only to Europeans) through the Dutch Codes. Book III of the Civil Code provides for the maatschap 
(perserikatan perdata) which is a contractual partnership usually used for a single business endeavour where the 
partners act under their own names. The Commercial Code (Chapter III, arts 16-18) also established the firma, 
an unlimited partnership where each partner has full liability and business is conducted under a trade name. 
Finally, the Commercial Code (art. 19) also established the Commanditaire Vennootschaap (CV), a variety of 
firma which is a limited partnership of ordinary and silent partners, where only the ordinary partners bear 
personal liability. The CV in particular continues to be very popular for small and medium sized businesses in 
Indonesia (at least for those that choose to have a form of legal entity status rather than operating informally) 
due to it being quite easy to establish. 
26 Pistor et al. The Evolution of Corporate Law, supra note 2, at 802, 814.  
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of local companies. The Cultivation System was established in 1830 in order to bring rapid 
financial returns to the Netherlands. Farmers in Java were given a choice of paying a land tax 
of produce or to allot a percentage of their land to export crops, especially coffee and sugar, 
to be sold at fixed prices. This was a colonial state system of exploitation which actively 
discouraged private sector involvement.27 All private exploitation of minerals and oil was 
also precluded and private shipping also restricted by the monopoly of the Dutch import and 
export agency, the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM).28 Only a handful of other 
colonial companies including the Javasche Bank operated during this era.29 There was some 
incorporation activity in the late 1850s and 1860s,30 and by 1870 there were 23 banking and 
insurance companies and eight transportation companies in the Netherlands Indies.31  
The Netherlands Indies economy was opened to private foreign investment in 1870. This 
‘Liberal Policy’ coincided with the Dutch colonial regime’s expansion of power beyond Java 
into the Outer Territories and led to the introduction of capital intensive plantation agriculture 
particularly on Sumatra’s East Coast.32 This liberalisation of the colonial economy brought 
the limited liability company into more widespread use in the Netherlands Indies. 
Incorporation into limited companies was the means for initial flows of foreign, mainly Dutch, 
investment into the colony. From the 1870s, dozens of companies were incorporated each 
year, and after 1896 the numbers grew to more than 100 each year, reaching a peak in 1910 
                                                 
27 J. A. M. Caldwell, Indonesian Export and Production from the Decline of the Culture System to the First 
World War, in THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA: STUDIES IN ECONOMIC 
HISTORY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY, 72, 73 (C. D. Cowan ed., 1964). Although note that the Cultivation 
System did allow some private capital formation as government sugar contractors, retired government agents 
and private agency houses were able to expand into areas that the colonial state was not interested in, see Robert 
van Niel, The Legacy of the Cultivation System for Subsequent Economic Development, in INDONESIAN 
ECONOMIC HISTORY IN THE DUTCH COLONIAL ERA 67, 86 (Anne Booth, W.J. O’Malley & Anna 
Weidemann eds., 1990).   
28 Caldwell, supra note 27, at 74. The NHM was founded in 1824 by the King primarily to be the import and 
export agency for the Netherlands throughout the world, but particularly for the Netherlands Indies.  
29 Von J. N. F. M. à Campo, Strength , Survival and Success. A Statistical Profile of Corporate Enterprise in 
Colonial Indonesia 1883-1913, 1 JAHRBUCH FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE 45 (1995); John O. Sutter,  
Indonesianisasi: An Historical Survey of the Role of Politics in the Institutions of a Changing Economy from 
the Second World War to the Eve of the General Elections  87 (1959) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell 
University).  
30 À Campo, supra note 29, at 46.  
31 Id. at 48-49.  
32  The plantation system on Sumatra’s East Coast was generally financed by companies based in the 
Netherlands rather than in the Netherlands Indies. These companies would employ a salaried plantation manager. 
Profits were made through cheap land and labour, and from 1880, the Coolie Ordinances, with penal sanctions 
for workers who breached their contracts, supported this profiteering. One of the first companies incorporated 
under the Liberal Policy was the Deli Maatschappij in 1869 which was established to exploit the new planting 
opportunities on Sumatra’s East Coast. It was backed by the NHM. This was followed by the establishment of 
many small tobacco firms, but many of these went bankrupt in 1891 when the tobacco market collapsed. See 
ANN LAURA STOLER, CAPITALISM AND CONFRONTATION IN SUMATRA’S PLANTATION BELT, 
1870-1979 16-17 (1985).  
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when 326 new corporations were founded. 33 Many of these companies were short-lived, 
while others grew to become permanent institutions in the colony. 34  There were 2,400 
incorporated companies in the Netherlands Indies in 1914. This number increased to around 
3,700 in 1920 and then declined due to the Great Depression to 2,800 in 1930, and to fewer 
than 2,200 in 1940.35 Data from 1930 show that corporate activity in the Netherlands Indies 
was dominated by Dutch corporations with headquarters in the Netherlands. These held 70% 
of registered equity, compared to 14% of Netherlands Indies firms. Some 4% of corporations 
were owned by ethnic Chinese, and British owned companies held almost 10% of the total.36  
Indigenous owned companies were very rare. 37  Corporate activities in the colony were 
supported by the establishment of a small securities exchange in Batavia in 1912. This closed 
during the First World War but was revived in 1925 with additional exchanges in Surabaya 
and Semarang. 
The applicability of the Commercial Code to the Chinese population had implications for the 
use of the NV form during the colonial era. As noted, originally the Commercial Code was 
only applied to Europeans. The Commercial and Civil Codes were extended to the Chinese 
population in Java in 1855 38  as a way of protecting Europeans in their commercial 
transactions with the Chinese traders who were considered to have questionable business 
practices. 39  However, this extension was apparently not strictly enforced. 40  While some 
Chinese traders saw the benefits of limited personal liability, and used the European business 
form to their advantage, registration of Chinese companies was uncommon. 41  Chinese 
                                                 
33 À Campo, supra note 29, at 47.  
34 J. THOMAS LINDBLAD, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 71 (1998).  
35 J. THOMAS LINDBLAD, BRIDGES TO NEW BUSINESS: THE ECONOMIC DECOLONIZATION OF 
INDONESIA 22 (2008).  
36 Id., at 22.  
37 See Maarten Kuitenbrouwer & Huibert Schijf, The Dutch Colonial Business Elite at the Turn of the Century, 
22 ITINERARIO 61, 63 (1998) (stating that only 0.8% of companies in the Netherlands Indies in 1902 were 
Indonesian owned). Note that there is some ambiguity about this data given that indigenous businesses did not 
officially have access to the NV form under the Commercial Code until 1917.  It may that this data refers to 
companies formed by those indigenous people who had been equated with European legal status under an 1871 
law.  
38 Staatsblad no. 79/1855.  
39 Charles A. Coppel, The Indonesian Chinese: “Foreign Orientals”, Netherlands Subjects, and Indonesian 
Citizens, in LAW AND THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 133 (M. Barry Hooker ed., 2002); P. TJIOOK 
LIEM, DE RECHTPOSITIE DER CHINEZEN IN NEDERLANDS-INDIË, 1848-1942 [THE LEGAL 
POSITION OF THE CHINESE IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES], 137-138 (2009).   
40 Daniel Fitzpatrick, Chinese Family Firms in Indonesia and the Question of ‘Confucian Corporatism’, in 
LAW AND THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 150, 161 (M. Barry Hooker ed., 2002).  
41 W.L. CATOR, THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF THE CHINESE IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES 54 
(1936). 
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businesses instead frequently utilised their own customary business form – the kongsi. 42 
Kongsi existed in various local forms with different types of liability. They were often 
informal partnership and cooperative-type companies. The law of 1855 also provided for the 
formalisation of the kongsi through registration of their internal contracts with the local 
district court. This was aimed at ensuring that real debtors within the kongsi could be 
identified.43  
Most Chinese firms were relatively small and in the services sector,44 but there were some 
exceptions, including the Kian Gwan sugar and trading company formed in Semarang in 
1863, firstly as a kongsi and later as an NV.45 Kian Gwan rivalled the leading Dutch trading 
firms in the colony and went on to become the longest enduring Chinese company in 
Indonesia. 46 There is evidence that those Chinese firms incorporated as NV still tended to 
function as family associations dominated by one chief founder, and that the provisions of the 
Commercial Code were often breached. In particular, there was little division between 
personal and business capital.47 Further formalisation of the kongsi was undertaken in 1927 in 
order to clarify the extent of liability of members.48 At that time the kongsi was deemed by 
law to be a partnership with joint and several liability, and provision was made for their 
conversion into firma.49 Consequently, the NV form with its limited liability became far more 
attractive to Chinese businesses.50  
The partnership and company business forms under the Dutch Codes were not made available 
to indigenous Indonesians until 1917.51 This is discussed further in Section 2.4 below in 
                                                 
42 Id., at 51. Kongsi (also spelt gongsi or kongsie) were Chinese associations found throughout Southeast Asia. 
The term covered a range of organisations from business partnerships to clan and regional associations and even 
triad or ‘secret’ societies. Most kongsi were institutions in which members could pool labour or capital towards 
some economic objective such as a mine, plantation or trading voyage. 
43 Nono Anwar Makarim, Companies and Business in Indonesia 70-71 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Harvard University Law School).   
44 LINDBLAD, supra note 35, at 73.  
45 J. Panglaykim & I. Palmer, Study of Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries: The Development of One 
Chinese Concern in Indonesia, 1 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 85 (1970). 
46 LINDBLAD, supra note 34, at 75.  
47 CATOR, supra note 41, at 62; and Makarim, supra note 43, at 95. See also the discussion in Section 4 below 
for further mention of the kongsi.  
48 Staatsblad no. 129/1927.   
49 See supra note 25 regarding the firma and other partnership forms in the Dutch Codes.  
50 See Makarim, supra note 43, at 89; J.A. Rubenkoning, Eenige Beschouwingen over het recht van de kongsie 
in Nederl.-Indie [Some Reflections on the law of the kongsi in the Netherlands Indies], DE NAAMLOOZE 
VENNOOTSCHAP 132 (15 August 1924); L. Gotzen, Het Nederlandsch-Indische Handelsrecht en de 
Chineesche Naamlooze Vennootschappen [The Netherlands Indies Commercial Law and the Chinese Limited 
Liability Companies], DE LOCOMOTIEF, 24 April 1924, 25 April 1924, 26 April 1924, and 28 April 1924.   
51 Staatsblad no. 12/1917. 
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relation to the Indigenous Joint Stock Company. It should also be noted that the 1920s saw 
the development of state-owned enterprises laws in the Netherlands Indies.52  
2.2 The 1928 Amendments to the Commercial Code in the Netherlands  
 
In 1928, the Netherlands updated its Commercial Code articles on the limited liability 
company for the first time,53 but the Netherlands Indies did not follow suit. This lack of 
action marked a significant fork in the path of the development of company law between the 
Netherlands and its most economically significant colony. In the Netherlands, from around 
the 1860s the Commercial Code was widely criticised. In particular, the requirement to obtain 
royal assent for incorporation was seen as restrictive. The sparse 21 articles had also failed to 
set out the divisions of power within the company, shareholders’ obligations to pay in their 
capital or the extent of personal liability of company founders, directors and commissioners. 
There were almost no protections for shareholders and creditors.54 During the last quarter of 
the 19th century a number of company bankruptcies occurred in the Netherlands that were 
related to the theft of company funds by managers and subsequently the lack of investor 
protection in the Commercial Code became a matter of public concern. From 1871 various 
pledges and proposals for reform were put forward by Ministers in response to these 
criticisms but were each withdrawn due to disagreement among drafters and inability to 
progress through Parliament. A new, more comprehensive, company law was eventually 
enacted in 1928 after a long process of consultations and drafting committees.55  
 
The 1928 amendments to the Commercial Code produced 120 articles compared to the 21 of 
the old. Most of the new provisions were mandatory. They were based on four principles: 
                                                 
52 The Indische Comptabiliteitswet (Netherlands Indies Public Accounting Law) of 1925 (Staatsblad no. 
448/1925) enabled companies that were owned and operated by government departments such as printing 
presses but these were usually not commercial (note that earlier versions of this law were introduced in the 
1860s).Then the Indische Bedrijvenwet (Netherlands Indies State Enterprises Law) was passed in 1927 
(Staatsblad no. 419/1927) which was used for the creation of some public utilities including in the mining, 
agriculture and railways sectors. See J. Panglaykim, Some Aspects of State Enterprises in Indonesia, in 
PEMIKIRAN DAN PERMASALAHAN EKONOMI DI INDONESIA DALAM SETENGAH ABAD 
TERAKHIR 66 (Hadi Soesastro ed., vol. 2, 2005).  
53 Staatsblad Nederlands no. 216/1928 (came into force on 1 April 1929). Following the framework of Pistor et 
al., supra note 2, this comparatively long delay in updates occurring in the Netherlands company law might also 
be attributed to the fact that it too was a transplant, having been largely adopted from the French model. 
However, it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss this possibility given the focus on Indonesia.  
54 VAN HEIJDEN & VAN DER GRINTEN, supra note 23, at 14; Abe de Jong & Ailsa Röell, Financing and 
Control in the Netherlands: A Historical Perspective, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL MANAGERS 467, 471 
(Randall K. Morck ed., 2005);  A. van Oven, One Hundred and Fifty Years of Dutch Commercial Law, 30 
NETH. INT’L L. REV. 187, 195 (1983).   
55 VAN HEIJDEN & VAN DER GRINTEN, supra note 23, at 15-21.  
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preventative government monitoring, transparency of internal organisation, division of 
powers including the obligation to publish full annual accounts, protection of capital against 
excessive payouts to shareholders, and strengthened liability of founders, management and 
directors. 56  The new law largely addressed the problems with the old version of the 
Commercial Code, although it maintained the requirement for state approval for company 
formation.57 Despite its strengths, there were still a number of objections to the amended 
version – it had failed to distinguish between public and private companies and it did not 
establish remedies for minority shareholders. On the other hand, companies that had preferred 
the flexibility of the old version of the Code objected to the strengthened liability of 
management and to the obligation to publish accounts.58 
 
There is mixed evidence as to why the changes of 1928 were not also adopted in the 
Netherlands Indies by the colonial administration. 59The Concordance Principle generally 
presumed that Netherlands law would be extended to its colonies, but the principle was 
selectively applied and there was often a gap of many years before laws were copied across.60 
It was reported in 1939 that the Volksraad expected to consider a draft ordinance in the 
following year to amend the Commercial Code articles on the NV to make them concordant 
with the law of the Netherlands.61 Most likely this intention was eventually overtaken by the 
outbreak of the Second World War. However, it is curious that in 1940 other updates were 
made to the Commercial Code to follow the Concordance Principle, specifically to the second 
book on maritime law. 62 This occurred less than six months after the Netherlands had 
updated this law, which suggests that this had greater urgency than reform of the articles on 
the NV. Makarim (1978) conjectured that the failure to follow the lead of the Netherlands 
may have been due to the absence of a similar public movement for company law reform in 
                                                 
56 De Jong & Röell, supra note 54, at 472.  
57 Van Oven, supra note 54, at 195.  
58 De Jong & Röell, supra note 54, at 472.  
59 Two sources note that the exact reason for the failure to follow the Netherlands pattern is unknown: Makarim, 
supra note 43, at 374, and R. SUKARDONO, HUKUM DAGANG INDONESIA [INDONESIAN 
COMMERCIAL LAW] 129 (1981). 
60 For example, in the Netherlands, the whole third book of the Commercial Code on bankruptcy was abolished 
and a new bankruptcy law enacted in 1893 to replace it (which came into effect in 1896). The Netherlands 
Indies eventually followed suit with a law passed in 1905 and enforced in 1906.   
61 Wet op de N.V.’s: Eisch der Concordantie [Law on Limited Liability Companies: The Concordance 
Principle], DE INDISCHE COURANT, 21 July 1939, at 1.  
62 Wetboek van Koophandel: Wijziging Voorgesteld [The Commercial Code: Amendments Proposed], DE 
INDISCHE COURANT, 9 January 1940, at 1; Handelingen Volksraad, Zittingsjaar (Sitting Year) 1939-1940, 
Onderwerp (Draft) 105. The Netherlands law was (Nederlands Staatsblad no. 204 of 16 September 1939).  
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the colony.63 However, it should be remembered that at the time the majority of companies 
doing business in the Indies were incorporated and headquartered in the Netherlands and so 
would have come under the 1928 reforms in any case. It is also possible that policy-makers, 
perhaps in their role of supporting colonial enterprise, preferred the flexibility and simplicity 
of the older version of the Code. The fact that some minor incorporation procedure 
amendments were made to the Netherlands Indies Commercial Code articles on the NV in 
193764 and 193865 also supports the possibility that a deliberate choice may have been taken 
not to follow the law reforms of the Netherlands.  
 
2.3 The 1939 Law on the Indigenous Joint Stock Company  
 
The Netherlands Indies also went its own way in 1939 when the Volksraad enacted a special 
ordinance creating the Inlandsche Maatschappij op Aandeelen (IMA) or Indigenous Joint 
Stock Company.66 This was a company form for indigenous Indonesians only which was 
simple and inexpensive to establish (no notarial deed was required) and conferred limited 
liability on shareholders. The IMA had a shorter lifespan (30 years unless granted an 
extension) compared to the NV (usually 75 years), and had restrictions on the ownership of 
land (75 ha of land or 25 ha of rice paddy).67 The IMA was originally restricted to Java and 
Madura, and the IMA could not own land outside those two islands, but these restrictions 
were lifted in 1942.68 The IMA was also required to submit financial reports twice a year to 
the court that originally gave it permission to incorporate. The law also set out detailed 
procedures for company registration and what components had to be included in the founding 
                                                 
63 Makarim, supra note 43, at 374.  
64 Staatsblad no. 572/1937. This amendment enabled the Governor-General to delegate the authority to give 
permission for incorporation to the Director of Justice.  
65 Staatsblad  no. 276/1938, art. II(16).This amendment removed the restriction that NVs had to be ‘trading 
companies’ (handels-onderneming) so that they could then carry out any type of business.  
66 Staatsblad no. 569/1939. This law came into force on 1 February 1940 (Staatsblad no. 717/1939). The word 
‘Indlandsche’ or ‘native’ was often replaced with ‘Indonesische’ following Independence. It has also often been 
referred to in Indonesian as Maskapai Andil Indonesia (MAI). For further discussion of the content of the IMA 
law, see: P. G. A. K. VOLTEN, MASKAPAI ANDIL BOEMIPUTERA (IMA): KETERANGAN DAN 
OERAIANJA [THE INDIGENOUS JOINT STOCK COMPANY (IMA): ITS EXPLANATION AND 
COMMENTARY] (K. St. Pamoentjak trans., 1940); SYBRANDUS VAN DER BIJ, DE WETTELIJKE 
REGELINGEN VAN DE RECHTSPERSOONLIJKHEID BEZITTENDE PRIVAATRECHTELIJKE 
INLANDSCHE VEREENIGINGEN IN NED. INDIЁ [THE LEGAL REGULATION OF THE LEGAL 
PERSONALITY POSSESSED BY PRIVATE LAW NATIVE ASSOCIATIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
INDIES] (1942); SUKARDONO, supra note 59, at 197-239; Makarim, supra note 43, at 156-161.  
67 This is significant particularly because NVs, being part of the European legal sphere, were not allowed to own 
native land at all (Staatsblad no. 179/1875), although NVs could obtain heritable leases (Staatsblad 
no.118/1850). 
68 Staatsblad no.13/1942. This amendment was passed on 10 January 1942, just as the Japanese invasion of the 
Netherlands Indies was beginning. These changes came into force on 1 February 1942 (Staatsblad no. 14/1942).  
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articles – purpose, founders, details of share capital and so on. Thus, the colonial state 
retained far more control of the IMA than it had over the NV. This law was also considerably 
more detailed on internal management issues than the Commercial Code. It had sections on 
the general meeting of shareholders, roles and responsibilities of board members, shareholder 
voting rights and procedures, bookkeeping and winding-up. A board of commissioners was 
optional. A further significant difference was that the IMA incorporated some elements of the 
cooperative society form, 69  in that directors and commissioners had to be shareholders 
themselves, proxy voting was only permitted if proxy was given to another shareholder, and 
no shareholder, regardless of numbers of shares held personally or by proxy, could have more 
than 12 votes or more than 1/3 of the voting rights. Contracts made by the IMA, including 
contracts of employment, were to follow adat law.   
 
The IMA was a unique legal construct and there does not appear to have been any close 
equivalent elsewhere. The enactment of this law needs to be understood in the context of the 
race-based plural legal system in the Netherlands Indies, the introduction of the ‘Ethical 
Policy’, changing colonial thinking about the place of indigenous Indonesians in the colony’s 
society and economy, and the rising nationalist movement. This all occurred against the 
economic backdrop of the relatively prosperous 1920s, followed by the Depression and the 
sudden disastrous plunge in the prices of Indonesia’s main exports (rubber, sugar, coffee and 
tobacco). Protectionist limits on imports were introduced in 1933 which triggered a boom in 
manufacturing in Java.  
 
In 1901 the Dutch colonial regime had instituted a new ‘Ethical Policy’ in its approach to 
native Indonesians. This was a less exploitative approach (at least in theory) aimed at the 
‘uplifting of the indigenous peoples’. This change triggered a debate regarding the plural 
legal system in the Netherlands Indies. Some prominent Ethici such as Conrad van 
Deventer 70  argued for the abandonment of pluralism and for the emancipation of the 
                                                 
69 See Zeylemaker, supra note 24 (referring to these ‘cooperative elements’ within the IMA); and, M. SJAFEI, 
BAGAIMANA MEMAKAI MASKAPAI ANDIL INDONESIA UNTUK PEMBANGUNAN EKONOMI 
NASIONAL [HOW TO USE THE INDONESIAN JOINT STOCK COMPANY FOR NATIONAL 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT] 32 (1952) (saw the IMA as falling somewhere between the cooperative and 
the NV limited liability form in terms of size, the need for members to know and trust each other, and the extent 
of members’ participation in management).  
70 Conrad Theodore van Deventer (1857-1915) wrote the essay Een Eereschuld (A Debt of Honour) in 1899, 
which is credited with initiating the ‘Ethical Policy’. Van Deventer and his wife are also remembered for the 
role they played in the development of the Kartini schools and other educational institutions for girls in Java.   
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indigenous population by assimilating them into European law.71 They saw adat as being 
incapable of fulfilling the needs of the twentieth century and as perpetuating legal uncertainty. 
In opposition were Cornelis van Vollenhoven, Professor of law at Leiden University, and his 
stable of adat law scholars who argued for the preservation of adat law as being the right and 
natural system for indigenous society. They were opposed to unification but not to 
codification of adat and spent quite a lot of time and effort in compiling volumes of adat law. 
Van Vollenhoven was particularly concerned with the protection of customary property rights 
against business and the state. Van Vollenhoven’s group gained the upper hand and was able 
to block moves in 1904 and 1923 that intended to unify civil law in the Indies along 
European lines. 72 Thus, the plural legal system, and the position of adat within it, was 
preserved, and from 1927 Dutch colonial legal policy was characterised by ‘enlightened 
dualism’.73 
 
This debate was particularly concerned with the effects of the colonial legal system on the 
native economy. Colonial commentators, particularly the influential J.H. Boeke,74 saw a dual 
economy where native Indonesians were not involved in modern trade, but were passive and 
stagnant.75 There was awareness that the expectations of the Liberal period had not been 
realised – native Indonesians had failed to copy the pattern of Western enterprise. The 
European company form was not offered to indigenous Indonesians until 1917 when a law 
was passed permitting indigenous Indonesians to voluntarily submit themselves partially or 
fully to the Commercial and Civil Codes, 76 but few took this opportunity to take advantage 
of the limited liability company form. 77  Indigenous businesses ‘often chose modes of 
                                                 
71 Coppel, supra note 39, at 136.  
72 JOHN BALL, INDONESIAN LAW AT THE CROSSROADS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 1.19 
(1996); David Bourchier, Positivism and Romanticism in Indonesian Legal Thought, in INDONESIA: LAW 
AND SOCIETY, 94, 97 (Tim Lindsey ed., 2nd ed, 2008). 
73 BALL, supra note 72, at 1.22. Although note that the Criminal Code was unified across racial groups in 1915 
(Staatsblad no. 732/1915), but a later attempt to unify criminal procedure failed.  
74 Julius Herman Boeke (1884-1944) wrote his PhD dissertation in 1910 on the ‘dual economy’ of the 
Netherlands Indies before going to the colony where he became an economic advisor and eventually head of the 
cooperatives service.   
75 This argument held considerable power at the time although was essentially wrong; indigenous business 
during the colonial era included cigarette companies, banking, textiles and small scale manufacturing 
(LINDBLAD, supra note 35, at 33). Particularly outside Java, there was substantial merchant activity occurring 
between Dutch, Chinese and indigenous traders all often beyond government control (Peter Post, Formation of 
the Pribumi Business Elite in Indonesia, 1930s-1940s, in JAPAN, INDONESIA AND THE WAR: MYTHS 
AND REALITIES 87, 90 (Peter Post & Elly Touwen-Bouwsma eds., 1997)).   
76 Staatsblad no. 12/1917.  
77 Makarim, supra note 43, at 145.  
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incorporation that were not fully compatible with European business law’. 78 Meanwhile, 
Dutch companies almost never employed Indonesians or Chinese in their top echelons.79  
 
Endless debates occurred among colonial officials as to whether there needed to be a 
conscious effort to encourage economic enterprise among the native population, how to 
overcome the factors which hampered integration,80 and also how to protect the indigenous 
farmer from exploitation and loss of land by capital owners, particularly the Chinese. 81 
Sentiments in favour of indigenous Indonesians were balanced against a strong industrial 
lobby in the Netherlands that wanted preference given to Dutch capital in the colony and a 
market for Dutch products. 82  By the mid-1920s, Javanese nationalist intellectuals, 
particularly under the leadership of Dr Soetomo, 83  were also pressuring the colonial 
government to stimulate indigenous involvement in the modern economy.84  
 
The movement to bring indigenous Indonesians into the economy initially saw the 
cooperative form as the appropriate legal tool for change. J.H. Boeke was integral to the 
passing of a native cooperatives law in 1927. The earlier cooperatives law of 1915,85 which 
was a direct copy of the 1876 law in the Netherlands, was judged to be unsuitable for the 
native population.86 The 1915 law made the cooperative difficult and expensive to establish 
given the requirements for a notarial deed, to have articles of association in Dutch and to 
obtain consent for its establishment from the Governor General.87 In 1920, a Commission 
                                                 
78 LINDBLAD, supra note 35, at 33. See also VERSLAG VAN DE COMMISSIE VOOR INLANDSCHE 
RECHTSPERSONEN INGESTELD BIJ BESLUIT VAN DEN GOUVERNEUR-GENERAAL VAN 
NEDERLANDSH-INDIЁ VAN 14 MEI 1929 NO. 4X [REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON NATIVE 
LEGAL PERSONS INSTALLED BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE NETHERLANDS 
INDIES ON 14 MAY 1929] (1931) [hereinafter VERSLAG VAN DE COMMISSIE VOOR INLANDSCHE 
RECHTSPERSONEN] (documenting a number of native businesses and associations that were not using any 
form of Dutch ‘legal personality’).  
79 Sutter, supra note 29, at 95-96.  
80 ANNE BOOTH, THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH 
CENTURIES: A HISTORY OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 290 (1998).   
81 Id., at 291.  
82 BOOTH, supra note 80, at 290. 
83 Dr Soetomo (1888-1938) was a medical doctor educated in the Netherlands. On his return to the Netherlands 
Indies he developed his interests in the social and economic welfare of indigenous Indonesians and founded the 
Indonesische Studieclub in Surabaya in 1924. This was converted into Persatuan Bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian 
Unity Party) in 1931 and then merged with another leading nationalist group, Budi Utomo, to form Partai 
Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia Party) (Parindra) in 1935.    
84 Post, supra note 75, at 96.  
85 Staatsblad no. 431/1915. 
86 J. H. BOEKE, THE EVOLUTION OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES ECONOMY 153 (1946).  
87 M. ISKANDAR SOESILO, DINAMIKA GERAKAN KOPERASI INDONESIA: CORAK PERJUANGAN 
EKONOMI RAKYAT DALAM MENGGAPAI KESEJAHTERAAN BERSAMA [DYNAMICS OF THE 
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was formed under Boeke to look into the question of a more suitable approach, and this 
resulted in the passing of the ordinance on native cooperatives in 1927.88 For Boeke, ‘at last 
the right legislative path was found’. 89 Boeke knew that he was imposing a Western concept 
on the native population and felt that the solution to its success was in tailoring it to local 
requirements. The ordinance was ‘simple and positive in design and adapted to native 
concepts of law’.90 It was only for native Indonesians, was less expensive, did away with 
notarial deed requirements and articles of association could be in a local language. It also 
provided that native cooperatives would follow adat contract law.91 This ordinance did have 
some ‘ephemeral success’92 in supporting Indonesian traders and the numbers of cooperatives 
being formed increased during the 1930s.93 Cooperatives were also supported by nationalist 
movement organisations and gained a particular champion in the future Vice-President 
Muhammad Hatta. In 1933, a further law on cooperatives was passed following updates made 
in the Netherlands.94 This replaced the earlier 1915 law which still only applied to Europeans, 
and thus the pattern of having dual economic laws for natives and Europeans was continued.  
 
Although some cooperatives were being established, colonial government officials came to 
the realisation that Indonesian businesses were actually more interested in making profit than 
conforming to the ‘cooperative ideal’. 95  In 1929 the Governor General installed a 
Commission on Indigenous Legal Persons led by Prof. Mr. J.B. Zeylemaker,96 to advise the 
government on the feasibility of giving legal personality to indigenous associations generally, 
and indigenous joint stock companies in particular, and to consider what interests would be 
affected by doing so. This move was specifically triggered by requests from the nationalist 
                                                                                                                                                        
INDONESIAN COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT: FEATURES OF THE PEOPLE’S ECONOMIC STRUGGLE 
IN ACHIEVING PROSPERITY TOGETHER] 46-48 (2008). 
88 Staatsblad no. 91/1927. See: J.H. BOEKE, STELSEL EN INHOUD VAN DE REGELING INLANDSCHE 
COOPERATIEVE VEREENIGINGEN (STBL. 1927 NO. 91) [SYSTEM AND CONTENT OF THE NATIVE 
COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION REGULATION] (1927) (an explanation in Dutch and Malay of the details of 
the native cooperative law of 1927).  
89 BOEKE, supra note 86, at 153.  
90 Id.  
91 Art. 3(2) of the Staatsblad no. 91/1927 on Native Cooperatives (which read that agreements/contracts made 
by the cooperative were to follow native civil and trade law).   
92 Sutter, supra note 29, at 102.  
93 Id.; SOESILO, supra note 87, at 48-50.   
94 Staatsblad no. 108/1933.  
95 BOEKE, supra note 86, at 156. See also David Henley, Custom and Koperasi: The Cooperative Ideal in 
Indonesia, in THE REVIVAL OF TRADITION IN INDONESIAN POLITICS: THE DEPLOYMENT OF 
ADAT FROM COLONIALISM TO INDIGENISM 87 (Jamie S. Davidson & David Henley eds., 2007) 
(discussing the ‘cooperative ideal’ and how the concept travelled through time in Indonesia from its beginnings 
in the 1920s).  
96 J. B. Zeylemaker was Professor of commercial law at the Law School in Batavia. He arrived in the 
Netherlands Indies in about July 1926.  
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Indonesische Studieclub in Surabaya and its establishment of the first indigenous bank, Bank 
Nasional Indonesia, in 1929. This bank was incorporated as an NV but encountered various 
problems caused by the plural legal system when it attempted to operate within the ‘native 
legal sphere’.97  
 
The Commission researched the rising native trading and industrial class and the business 
forms being used and consulted various groups in Java and Madura on whether an indigenous 
legal corporate form was needed. The Commission itself split over this question, although it 
eventually fell in with the view that modern legal mechanisms were needed to promote 
economic activity among the indigenous population because such mechanisms would not 
arise naturally within adat law.98 The Commission submitted a draft law to this effect in 1931, 
but it took another eight years to be enacted.99  Initially the proposal was opposed by the 
sugar industry which saw the law as a threat –– it feared the creation of large estates which 
could challenge existing interests. Other commentators also feared that indigenous companies 
would buy up land and exploit small farmers. 100 During the 1930s, the calls for limited 
liability from indigenous business groups continued to grow101 and the damage to the sugar 
industry during the Depression lessened that industry’s power to oppose it. 102  To allay 
concerns about possible dispossession of farmers, the draft law was amended to include the 
restrictions on land ownership103 and the limit to 30 years lifespan.104  
 
Some colonial authorities had great expectations that the IMA would prove useful, 105 and 
there was certainly interest among the indigenous business community at the time. 106 
                                                 
97 VAN DER BIJ, supra note 66, at 34-35.   
98 VERSLAG VAN DE COMMISSIE VOOR INLANDSCHE RECHTSPERSONEN, supra note 78, at 8; 
Zeylemaker, supra note 24.  
99 The IMA law was part of a suite of legislation passed on indigenous legal persons in 1939. Staatsblad no. 
570/1939 gave legal personhood to registered ‘native associations’ and Staatsblad no. 571 provided for judicial 
winding-up of native legal entities. These two laws were also the result of the efforts of the 1929 Commission 
on Native Legal Persons.  
100 Zeylemaker, supra note 24, at 210.   
101 BOEKE, supra note 86, at 153-157.  
102 Zeylemaker, supra note 24, at 210; Makarim, supra note 43, at 160.  
103 The original recommendation of the Commission on Native Legal Persons was that the IMA would be 
restricted to 50 bouws of land, but could own more with permission of the Governor General. In the final 
version of the law this was changed to a restriction to 75 hectares of dry land or 25 hectares of wet rice paddy. 
See Zeylemaker, supra note 24, at 211 (who thought this change was more psychological than real as it allayed 
the fears of lawmakers, but there was a loophole that allowed greater landholdings if a licence was granted). 
104 BOEKE, supra note 86, at 157. Discussion of the changes was recorded in the proceedings of the Volksraad: 
Zittingsjaar 1938-1939, Onderwerp 159 (Sitting Year 1938-1939, Draft 159) and Zittingsjaar 1939-1940, 
Onderwerp 22 (Sitting Year 1939-1940, Draft 22).  
105 BOEKE, supra note 86, at 157.   
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However, the IMA was little used. The outbreak of the Second World War occurred before it 
could be much tested, and following Independence most indigenous entrepreneurs chose the 
NV form despite the fact that the IMA was cheaper to establish. 107  Post-Independence 
policies would require businesses to use the NV form in order to contract with the 
government.108 The NV was seen as more international in style and probably as being less 
tainted by colonial paternalism. The NV also had none of the ‘cooperative’ type restrictions 
of the IMA such as the need for directors to be shareholders. Another reason for the lack of 
take-up of the IMA was that incorporation procedures via courts rather than through a notary 
actually became more difficult due to judges being busy with other work. The ‘notary-minded’ 
legal culture that had developed also resulted in the Ministry of Justice often receiving 
applications for IMAs via notaries, which would then have to be returned with instructions to 
apply via a judge.109 Makarim (1978) was able to locate only four IMAs still in business in 
Java and Madura and a small cluster of about 20 small market banks in Bali using the IMA 
form,110 and apparently only a few IMA companies continued to exist into the 1990s.111 
Formally, the dualism of having both the Commercial Code articles on the NV and the 
separate IMA continued until both were superseded by the 1995 Companies Law.112  
  
                                                                                                                                                        
106 See Sutter, supra note 29, at 105-106 (cites the future Vice-President Muhammad Hatta as suggesting that 
investors would buy shares in IMAs not because they sought large profits from such a company but because 
they saw ‘spiritual ties’ in the IMA that did not exist in the NV). See also SJAFEI, supra note 69, at 33 
( recommended the use of the IMA for Indonesians who were more ‘advanced’ than average villagers and 
wanted to run small companies or agricultural companies that needed the right to own land). The publisher Balai 
Pustaka produced a Malay translation of the IMA law in 1940 in an effort to promote it – see VOLTEN, supra 
note 66.   
107 Makarim, supra note 43, at 160; Daniel Lev, The Lady and the Banyan Tree: Civil Law Change in Indonesia, 
14 AM. J COMP. LAW 282, 286 (1960).  
108 Makarim, supra note 43, at 170; Anni Abbas Manopo, Masalah PT (Perseroan Terbatas) di Indonesia 
Sekarang [Current Problems of the Limited Liability Company in Indonesia], in SIMPOSIUM 
PEMBAHARUAN HUKUM DAGANG NASIONAL, TANGGAL 10-12 NOPEMBER 1980, DI 
YOGYAKARTA 85, 87 (Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional, 1984).   
109 Hajati Suroredjo, Masalah Pembaharuan Hukum Dagang [Problems of Commercial Law Reform], in 
SIMPOSIUM PEMBAHARUAN HUKUM DAGANG NASIONAL, TANGGAL 10-12 NOPEMBER 1980, DI 
YOGYAKARTA 34, 40 (Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional, 1984).   
110 Makarim, supra note 43, at 171.  
111 Benny Tabalujan, The New Indonesian Company Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 883, 885 (1996).   
112 It seems that some later discussion regarding reforming the IMA law to fit changing circumstances did occur. 
See Suroredjo, supra note 109, at 39 (noting that a workshop on the topic of the IMA was held in Padang, West 
Sumatra on 13-14 May 1980 organised by the West Sumatra Provincial Development Agency).  
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2.4  Independence, Legal Unification and Economic Ideology  
 
Following Independence, the path of Indonesia’s company law was largely a consequence of 
provisions in the different Constitutions (1945 and 1950) and the ideology that they 
expressed.113 The 1945 Constitution concentrated power in the hands of the executive and its 
drafters explicitly rejected the inclusion of individual rights. The 1950 Constitution, despite 
intentions that it would be quickly revised, provided the basis for the period of parliamentary 
democracy which lasted up until 1959 when President Sukarno declared a return to the 1945 
Constitution. Although the two Constitutions were radically different in the political systems 
that they respectively established,114 they contained essentially similar provisions regarding 
the continuation of colonial law and the ideological basis for economic policy.   
Both Constitutions provided that all colonial laws would continue to be valid until explicitly 
replaced. National leaders had little option on this point but to avoid a legal vacuum. 
However, the formal continuation of the race-based plural legal system was at odds with the 
desire for a new egalitarian system where all persons were to be treated either as citizens or 
non-citizens.115 The Commercial Code was still formally only valid for Europeans and those 
indigenous Indonesians who declared themselves subject to it. The 1950 Constitution (art. 
102) called for codification of civil and commercial law, but many debates were had around 
how to change the old legal order to fit the new ideology, and whether the law, particularly 
private law, should be unified on European lines or on adat.116 Adat was seen by many 
nationalists as a symbol of a uniquely Indonesian identity and history and was idealised in 
opposition to the memory of imposed colonial rule. On the other hand, with so many different 
ethnic groups possessing their own adat rules, choosing one above the others would have 
caused ethnic divisions during a time when the new nation was still fragile. 
 
Contract and commercial law were seen as the easiest prospect for unification as there would 
be little imposition on adat practices and it would apply only to those who voluntarily 
                                                 
113 Note that there was also the very short-lived Federal Constitution of 1949.   
114 For an explanation of the differences between the two Constitutional systems, see Bourchier, supra note 72.    
115 Although note that legal and social discrimination against Chinese Indonesians was to continue for decades 
past Independence.   
116 For examples of this debate, see ST. K. MALIKUL ADIL, PEMBAHARUAN HUKUM PERDATA KITA 
[REFORM OF OUR CIVIL LAW] (1955); KO TJAY SING, KODIFIKASI AND UNIFIKASI HUKUM 
PERDATA DAN DAGANG [CODIFICATION AND UNIFICATION OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW] 
(1958). 
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engaged in business activities. 117 Unification of commercial law was also seen as desirable in 
order to protect indigenous Indonesians from Chinese business practices. 118 Even so, no 
legislative resolution of this complex problem was found and in practice it became an 
accepted principle that Indonesians became automatically subject to the Commercial Code 
whenever they engaged in transactions covered by it. That is, the formal requirement to 
‘submit’ to the Code according to the 1917 law was ignored. 119 The concept of 
‘internationality’ was also generally used to justify the retention of the Commercial and Civil 
Codes.120 It should be noted that there was never an authoritative Indonesian translation of 
the Dutch Codes, although there have been unofficial translations in circulation.121 In practice, 
the NV was renamed in Indonesian as the Perseroan Terbatas (PT).122 
 
Both the 1945 and 1950 Constitutions provided that ‘economic affairs are to be organised as 
a joint effort based on the family principle (azas kekeluargaan)’. 123  Although the 1945 
Constitution was principally drafted by Soepomo,124 this particular article is partly attributed 
to Vice-President Muhammad Hatta who was known for his championing of cooperatives and 
an economy primarily based on collectivist ideals that would reflect the already existing 
modes of social organisation of Indonesian village life. Hatta was convinced that 
cooperatives could compete with international (Dutch) corporations. 125  Many other 
politicians at the time shared this view that capitalism was not suited to Indonesia.126 Most 
                                                 
117 SING, supra note 116, at 17.  
118 Lev, supra note 107, at 288.  
119 BALL, supra note 72, at 4.12.  
120 Lev, supra note 107, at 303.  
121 For the Commercial Code, there was the Englebrecht system translation of 1960 and then a new set of 
translations in 1989 published by private publisher Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve (also using the Englebrecht system). 
The Commercial Code in Indonesian is Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Dagang (KUHD). For a more general 
discussion of the shift from Dutch to Indonesian as the language of law in Indonesia, see AB MASSIER, THE 
VOICE OF THE LAW IN TRANSITION (Michaela Wouters trans., 2008).  
122 There does not seem to have been a legal rule that required the change in name from Naamloze 
Vennootschap (NV) to Perseroan Terbatas (PT), although the term PT was certainly in use by the early 1950s. 
123 Art. 33 in the 1945 Constitution and Art. 38 in the 1950 Constitution. This article survives in the current 
amended version of the 1945 Constitution.  
124 Soepomo (1903-1958) completed his PhD at Leiden University under Cornelis van Vollenhoven.  Following 
Independence he served twice as Minister of Justice. He was an expert in adat law and the 1945 Constitution 
was largely based on his ‘integralistic’ view of the state, see Bourchier, supra note 71 (discussion of Soepomo’s 
role in the drafting of the 1945 Constitution). Muhammad Hatta (1902-1980), also educated in the Netherlands, 
was more democratic-minded than Soepomo but nonetheless supported the ‘family principle’ for economic 
policy.  
125 MAVIS ROSE, INDONESIA FREE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF MUHAMMAD HATTA 58, 118 
(2010).  
126 Anne Booth, Government and Welfare in the New Republic: Indonesia in the 1950s, 34 ITINERARIO 57, 
65-66 (2010).  
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saw a strong role for the state in coordinating the economy and undertaking large projects127 
while the people engaged in cooperatives. The idea of the cooperative was to resonate 
through time and unite Indonesian political elites despite rarely being successful in actually 
facilitating entrepreneurship. 128  Two cooperatives laws were passed in this era 129  and a 
sequence of national congresses on cooperatives was also held during the late 1940s and 
1950s.130 Arguably, the collectivist ideology of this era and its manifestation as a focus on 
cooperatives at least partly explains the lack of attention paid to company law reform.  
The parliamentary democracy era of the 1950s was generally characterised by a series of 
unstable coalitions, political in-fighting and little opportunity for significant law reform.131 
The legal and political uncertainty of this time did not, however, significantly hamper use of 
the corporate form. Many indigenous entrepreneurs had benefited from the Japanese 
occupation and seizure of Dutch companies,132and in the early 1950s there was a surge in the 
launching of new indigenous businesses. The Commercial Code NV/PT form was taken up 
by many indigenous entrepreneurs following independence – it was seen to represent 
modernity and prestige.133 For example, Achmad Bakrie turned his trading company into an 
NV in 1952. 134  The benteng 135  program of the 1950s also encouraged the formation of 
companies that were quickly set up to take advantage of import licences. In 1953, when 
abuses of the program were discovered 136 it became a formal requirement to establish a 
limited liability company.137 A 1953 national business directory listed 4,200 incorporated 
companies of which approximately 40% of trading firms and 33% of manufacturing firms 
                                                 
127 Article 38 of the 1950 Constitution also provided for state domination of important sectors of the economy.  
128 Henley, supra note 95, at 87; Robert C. Rice, The Origins of Basic Economic Ideas and their Impact on ‘New 
Order’ Policies, 19 BULL. INDON. ECON. STUD. 60, 63-65 (1983).    
129 Law no. 179/1949 and Law no. 79/1958. 
130 SOESILO, supra note 87, at 57-65.  
131 Tim Lindsey & Mas Achmad Santosa, The Trajectory of Law Reform in Indonesia: A Short Overview of 
Legal Systems and Change in Indonesia, in INDONESIA LAW AND SOCIETY 2, 8 (Tim Lindsey ed., 2nd ed., 
2008).  
132 Post, supra note 74, at 104.  
133 KAEHLIG, supra note 24, at 282; Lev, supra note 107, and the references at supra note 116.   
134 The Bakrie group is now one of the largest conglomerates in Indonesia. It is headed by Aburizal Bakrie who 
was Coordinating Minister for Peoples Welfare 2004-2009, is now Chairman of the Golkar Party and will likely 
be a Presidential candidate in 2014.  
135 The benteng (fortress) program was aimed at breaking the dominance of Dutch firms by reserving the import 
of certain goods to indigenous entrepreneurs.  
136 See Jaspar van de Kerkhof, Indonesianisasi of Dutch Economic Interests, 1930-1960: The Case of Internatio, 
161 BIJDRAGEN TOT DE TAAL-, LAND- EN VOLKENKUNDE 181, 193 (2005) (describing how the 
program had many problems including corruption and the use of Indonesian straw men by Chinese and Dutch 
companies to evade the restrictions and ultimately failed in its aims). 
137 Makarim, supra note 43, at 165.  
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were indigenous.138 A small securities exchange was established in 1952 in Jakarta,139 but it 
collapsed in the late 1950s with the general economic malaise caused by the nationalisation 
of Dutch companies.140 
2.5  Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’ 
 
It was primarily ideology and the ‘supremacy of politics over economics’141 that inhibited 
substantive law reform, including company law reform, during Sukarno’s ‘Guided 
Democracy’ years. Parliamentary democracy ended when martial law was declared in 1957, 
and was completely dismantled in 1959 when Sukarno unilaterally reinstated the far less 
democratic 1945 Constitution. During Sukarno’s Guided Democracy regime authority and 
power were increasingly concentrated in Jakarta. President Sukarno was the symbolic source 
of authority supported by the army. Political parties were marginalised and NGOs lost their 
access to government. The legal system began to collapse and judges became open to 
bribes.142 Guided Democracy leaders tended to articulate ideology rather than positive law,143 
and the laws passed were often pieces of symbolic revolutionary rhetoric rather than having 
strictly regulatory aims.144  
At the Round Table Conference in The Hague in 1949, Indonesia had agreed to allow Dutch 
companies to continue to operate in independent Indonesia. This ensured the continued 
dominance of Dutch firms in the Indonesian economy during the early 1950s. 145  This 
dominance ended abruptly when the bitter conflict over sovereignty in the remaining Dutch 
territory of West Irian (West Papua) prompted Sukarno to forcibly acquire all Dutch 
companies in Indonesia in 1957. Labour unions were induced to take over Dutch companies, 
but union power was quickly replaced by military supervision. The nationalisation law of 
December 1958 formalised the takeovers. 146 Most Dutch nationals were quickly expelled 
                                                 
138 LINDBLAD, supra note 35, at 89.  
139 Established by a Decree in late 1951 and Emergency Law no. 15 of 3 October 1952.  
140 See DAVID C. COLE & BETTY F. SLADE, BUILDING A MODERN FINANCIAL SYSTEM: THE 
INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE 148 (1996).  See also Section 2.6 below for further mention of the development 
of Indonesia’s stock exchange.  
141 Kian Wie Thee, Indonesia’s Two Deep Economic Crises: The Mid 1960s and Late 1990s, 14 J. ASIA 
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142 The Basic Law on Judicial Powers (no. 19/1964) permitted the President to intervene in court cases.  
143 David K. Linnan, Indonesian Law Reform, or Once More Unto the Breach: A Brief Institutional History, in 
INDONESIA LAW AND SOCIETY 68, 75 (Tim Lindsey ed., 2nd ed., 2008). 
144 Lev, supra note 107, at 289.  
145 Kerkhof, supra note 136, at 189.  
146 Law no. 86/1958 on Nationalisation of Dutch-Owned Companies in Indonesia. See generally, Jasper van de 
Kerkhof, ‘Colonial’ Enterprise and the Indigenization of Management in Independent Indonesia and Malaysia, 
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from Indonesia. The outcomes of the nationalisation program were disastrous, resulting in 
worsening inflation and currency depreciation. Along with Sukarno’s refusal to heed expert 
advice and ‘utter neglect of sound economic policies’, 147  the nationalisation program 
eventually led to the economic crisis of the mid-1960s. 
From the basis of the newly acquired Dutch enterprises, the Sukarno Government promoted 
the state enterprise sector and actively discouraged the private sector.148 The regime aimed to 
create a socialist ‘unitary public sector economy’ with Indonesian features, and to restrict the 
role of Chinese businesses.149 The State-Owned Enterprises Law of 1960 attempted to unify 
the various existing categories of SOE.150 The goal of SOEs was not necessarily profit but 
was part of prevailing ideology about a just and prosperous society.151 There was also further, 
mostly unsuccessful, promotion of cooperatives. The early 1960s saw the growth in 
membership and power of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) which, among other 
objectives, promoted workers’ and farmers’ cooperatives. 
At this time, there was some continuing discussion of the position of the Commercial Code 
set within debates around unification and codification of Indonesian law.152 The Civil and 
Commercial Codes were certainly seen as outdated and as vestiges of the colonial regime,153 
and national policy statements of the time indicated that adat should be the basis for uniform 
laws. 154  The Institute of National Legal Development (LPHN) was formed in 1958 and 
reconstituted in 1961. 155 A committee was formed by LPHN in around 1961 headed by 
commercial law expert Professor Soekardono with the task of reviewing the entire 
Commercial Code, including the limited liability company articles. The results of this 
                                                                                                                                                        
in INDONESIAN ECONOMIC DECOLONIZATION IN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
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committee were not published until 1968, after Sukarno’s reign had come to an end.156 This 
draft aimed to ‘create a commercial code based on Indonesian national identity and the spirit 
of Pancasila157 that was also capable of being used in international (trade) relations’. This 
draft Code reproduced the existing legal entity forms from the Dutch Commercial Code, but 
with some changes and the addition of cooperatives. For limited liability companies the draft 
contained considerably more detail on establishment, division of power between directors, 
commissioners and shareholders, and on winding up (57 articles in total). Notably, article 83 
of the draft required directors and commissioners not only to heed the interests of 
shareholders but also the interests of the Indonesian people as a whole. This draft was never 
formally enacted, as is discussed further in Section F below.  
 
In the meantime, in 1962, Minister for Justice Dr. Sahardjo (1959-1963), unilaterally declared 
that the Codes were no longer to be regarded as strict written codifications but merely as a 
record of customary conventions which could be used as guidelines by courts.158 There was 
some hostility towards this move within the LPHN and among judges.159 The Supreme Court 
then mitigated this move in Circular Letter no. 3 of 5 September 1963 which stated that not 
all provisions in the Codes were to be regarded as invalid – only specific articles that 
contravened the Constitution,160 and hence the Commercial Code continued to be generally 
valid. In 1965 another committee was suddenly formed by the Ministry of Justice to draft a 
law on Gotong-Royong161 limited liability companies which would in essence forbid the use 
of majority voting rules and instead only use deliberation and consensus (musyawarah and 
mufakat) to reach decisions. This did not eventuate due to intervention by other ministers at 
                                                 
156 LEMBAGA PEMBINAAN HUKUM NASIONAL, RANTJANGAN UNDANG-UNDANG TENTANG 
KITAB UNDANG-UNDANG HUKUM DAGANG [DRAFT LAWS ON THE COMMERCIAL CODE] (1968). 
The foreword to this publication by the Caretaker Head of LPHN, J.C.T. Simorangkir, noted that this draft had 
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157 Pancasila are the five philosophical principles of the Indonesian state. In brief, they are: belief in one God, 
just and civilised humanity, the unity of the territory and people of Indonesia, democracy and social justice.  
158 See also Sahardjo, Pidato Wakil Menteri Pertama Dalam Negeri/Menteri Kehakiman Sahardjo, S.H. pada 
Malam Resepsi Pembukaan Seminar Hukum Nasional di Istana Negara pada tanggal 11 Maret 1963 [Speech 
by First Deputy Minister for Interior Affairs/Minister for Justice Sahardjo at the National Law Seminar 
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Simorangkir ed., 1980).  
159 Lev, supra note 107, at 292; Linnan, supra note 143, at 75. 
160 Sudargo Gautama, An Overview of the Indonesian Legal System (With Special Reference to Foreign 
Investments), in BUSINESS & INVESTMENT LAWS IN INDONESIA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST 
INDONESIA-SINGAPORE LAW SEMINAR (26-27 February 1993).  
161 Gotong-Royong may be defined as ‘mutual assistance’. It was an ostensibly Javanese adat concept borrowed 
into state discourse and was particularly used by President Sukarno to evoke ideas of tradition and to promote 
obedience to authority. See John Bowen, On the Political Construction of Tradition: Gotong Royong in 
Indonesia, 45 J. ASIAN STUD. 545 (1986).  
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the time.162 One of the final pieces of legislation enacted before the coup of September 1965 
was a law on cooperatives.163 This law positioned cooperatives as being a revolutionary tool 
and prescribed that cooperative management should reflect ‘revolutionary progressive 
strength’.164 
 
2.6 The Suharto Era and the 1995 Company Law 
 
Sukarno’s rule ended after the so-called attempted Communist Coup of September 1965. 
Then little-known General Suharto came to power in the aftermath of the coup and there was 
a drastic change in economic ideology from leftist to rightist. This new regime was 
proclaimed as the ‘New Order’ – it was essentially autocratic, with extreme concentration of 
power in the executive and only a thin veneer of democratic practices exercised through the 
executive- and military-dominated National Legislature.  
 
Despite repeated recognition of a need for change, Indonesia’s first major company law 
reform was not passed until 1995 during the late New Order regime. According to Linnan 
(2008), it is an enduring mystery as to exactly why the autocratic Suharto regime failed for so 
long to overturn out-dated colonial laws, including the company law articles in the 
Commercial Code. 165 Many unanswered questions remain because it was, and is, almost 
impossible to determine how policies were made and exactly which interests were 
involved.166 Legislative drafting was carried out behind closed doors and was not generally 
released to the public.167 Indonesian bureaucratic agencies tended not to communicate with 
each other very well and often did not know when another department was drafting a new 
law.168 Despite these uncertainties, the following general story of the lead up to the 1995 law 
can be pieced together from various sources. 
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In the turmoil of the late 1960s, under the aegis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the New Order regime quickly implemented measures to support large-scale foreign 
investment for natural resource exploitation. In return for international rescheduling of its 
debts, Indonesia agreed to reduce Sukarno’s legacy of emphasis on the state-owned sector 
and to encourage private, particularly foreign, investment.169 This change in economic and 
industrial policy was designed by a team of mostly US-trained technocrats appointed by 
Suharto. In the first year of Suharto’s Presidency, three pivotal laws were passed; Law 
no.1/1967 on Foreign Investment,170 Law no.5/1967 on Forestry, and Law no.11/1967 on 
Mining. The Foreign Investment Law included the requirement that foreign companies 
wanting to invest in Indonesia should incorporate a new Indonesian-domiciled company.171 
Although not a legal obligation, it was accepted in practice that businesses organised under 
the Domestic Investment Law of 1968 also had to use the NV company form.172  
There was at least nominal emphasis on black letter law reform during the early years of the 
New Order. 173 The Five Development Year Plan (Repelita) of 1969–1974 recognised the 
importance of the rule of law and the need for law reform to achieve development, and the 
second Repelita of 1974–1979 called for legal renewal, codification, and unification.174 The 
company law was not reformed during that short period of opportunity in the late 1960s but a 
new cooperatives law was passed.175 At that time there was an imperative to remove quickly 
the communist revolutionary connotations that were included in the 1965 cooperatives law 
and return the cooperative form to having an economic and not a political function. But this 
focus on the cooperative form is also at least partly explained by the ongoing power of the 
cooperatives ideal in Indonesian political philosophy.176 Suharto himself liked the idea of 
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cooperatives, but the New Order did not follow the earlier thinking of Hatta who had argued 
for the cooperative form to be used for large enterprises.177 The early New Order view was 
that big business should be under government control while the ordinary people were to be 
satisfied with the small sector economy. The regime would go on to give sustained 
encouragement to rural and village level cooperatives (KUDs) despite the lack of any great 
success.178  
A further contributing factor to the emphasis on cooperatives rather than on companies was 
that it was thought that time was needed for a thorough revision of the entire Commercial 
Code179 (recalling that cooperatives were never part of the Code). During the New Order 
there was still some continuing argument between different schools of thought over whether 
to adopt adat180or Western law in specific areas of law.181 Nonetheless the status of the Civil 
and Commercial Codes was re-established – in other words, there was further retreat from 
former Minister Sahardjo’s views on the validity of the colonial codes, and judges began to 
cite the codes as having the full force of the law.182 In December 1968, the LPHN held its 
second national law seminar. At that event a workshop with leading commercial law experts 
including Professor Sukardono discussed the existing Draft Commercial Code (as drafted by 
the LPHN during the Sukarno years, see Section 2.5 above) and concluded that more work 
was needed to be done to refine its principles and language. Particular articles in the draft 
were identified as being no longer appropriate since the end of the Sukarno regime.183 This 
draft Commercial Code was revised at least once more during the 1970s. Makarim (1978) 
noted that while it was generally influenced by Dutch law, the draft Commercial Code 
included requirements that articles of association contain the aim of contributing to the 
raising of the Indonesian standard of living and that directors were to be attentive to the 
interests of the masses. It also required a minimum of five persons to establish the company 
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and the board of supervisors was authorised to participate in management.184 This draft was 
to be eventually abandoned in favour of a single company law rather than a revamped 
Commercial Code, as is discussed further below.   
Foreign investment was strong throughout the 1970s and natural resources revenues, 
particularly from oil, were the main engine for Indonesian economic growth. This growth 
was successfully exploited by Suharto and his family and cronies for rent-seeking.185 The 
rent-seeking activities of the New Order elite included granting rights to natural resource 
exploitation and designation of mandatory ‘indigenous’ partners for foreign investors.  
Foreign investors tended to turn a blind eye to such practices but were, however, frustrated 
with the Commercial Code and the legal uncertainties and business risks that it created.186  In 
1971, an amendment to article 58 of the Commercial Code on shareholder voting rules was 
passed due to foreign investor pressure.187 The Commercial Code had mandated a six-vote 
limit regardless of percentage of shareholding – a system which protected minority 
shareholders. Foreign investors were unhappy with this voting limit as it impaired their 
ability to control joint ventures,188 and a compromise solution was found allowing individual 
companies to choose whether to adhere to the old voting system or adopt the one-share-one-
vote principle.  It is clear from the elucidation to this amendment that it was intended to be a 
stop-gap measure to fulfil an immediate need while a revision of the law on companies and 
partnerships was undertaken.189  
The wording of the 1971 amendment also indicated that focus had shifted from revising the 
entire Commercial Code to separately drafting a new company law.190 This was most likely 
due to the urgency placed on company law reform to bring it into line with other legislative 
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changes particularly the Foreign Investment Law. By the late 1970s, in addition to the LPHN 
Commercial Code draft, a separate company law draft produced by the Ministry of Justice 
was also in circulation (initiated by Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja).191 This draft was 
called the ‘Wiersma Draft’ for a Professor of law at Leiden University who had some input 
into it. 192 According to Makarim (1978) this draft was more strongly inspired by Dutch 
company law than the LPHN Commercial Code draft and it was certainly more detailed.193 
Notably it contained provision for a Dutch style court investigation of the company, but it 
also provided that some supervisors were to be appointed by the government rather than by 
shareholders.  
Usman (2004) relates how the Ministry for Justice draft was traded between bureaucratic 
departments and stalled at various points, and it was not until 1994 that the President gave 
permission for the draft to be put to Parliament.194 Meanwhile, a Capital Market Regulator 
(BAPEPAM) was initially set up in 1976, and the Jakarta Stock Exchange was re-established 
in 1977, but remained largely stagnant until 1989. There was little investor confidence due, at 
least partly to the weakness of the underlying legal framework.195 There was recognition of 
this weakness and there were some ultimately unsuccessful attempts to rectify this during the 
early 1980s. The Institute of National Legal Development (the LPHN was renamed as the 
BPHN in 1974) held a symposium on renewal of national commercial law in Yogyakarta in 
November 1980. The opening speech by the Minister for Justice (Mudjono) recognised the 
need to update the Commercial Code – ‘the Dutch have updated theirs but we have not. 
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Times have moved on’.196 Later, in 1985, the Dutch government funded some law reform 
efforts in Indonesia and under this program there were unsuccessful attempts to rewrite the 
commercial and criminal codes entirely.197  
At this time the oil price was high and the state had ready access to resources; hence mobile 
investors’ threats were not particularly constraining on policy-makers. 198  The group of 
Western-educated technocrats recruited in the late 1960s were still influential but did not 
seriously threaten President Suharto’s power.199 However, the collapse of the oil price in the 
mid-1980s resulted in Indonesia becoming more vulnerable to foreign demands to open up 
the economy, 200  and this gave greater space for the technocrats to exercise substantial 
influence over economic policy. 201 The technocrats initiated deregulation of the banking 
industry, capital market reform and trade and investment policies, and these measures 
resulted in growth of the private sector and particularly benefitted large corporations.202 It did 
not, however, lead to company law reform, most likely due to power struggles between the 
liberal economic reform-minded technocrats and the more conservative, Dutch-oriented 
approaches of the LPHN/BPHN and the Ministry of Justice.203 
 
In the meantime, the regulatory gaps left by the lack of company law reform were being at 
least partly filled by the Ministry of Justice which was regulating the content of articles of 
association when companies were given approval to incorporate.204 For example, in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the Ministry of Justice allowed companies to be formed with a single board of 
directors, but, without any announcement of a policy change, in the early 1980s began only 
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allowing companies with a dual board structure with a Board of Commissioners.205 From the 
mid-1980s, the Ministry also rejected articles of association that permitted bearer shares (with 
unregistered ownership) because this was a popular way of evading restrictions on foreign 
ownership.206 Other occasional written (especially in the form of surat edaran or circular 
letters) and verbal guidance also emanated from the Ministry of Justice.207 Further, it seems 
that companies themselves were also making modifications to their practices to fit modern 
conditions. When drafting their articles they were including changes they saw as valuable 
even if not required to do so by the Commercial Code.208  
The early 1990s saw a number of high profile company scandals in Indonesia which 
generated political settlements rather than legal action or legislative reaction. For example, in 
December 1990, it was discovered that the CEO of Bentoel, a large Chinese family-owned 
kretek (clove cigarette) manufacturer, had been grossly defrauding the company. Closer 
scrutiny then revealed that fraud and negligence, family squabbles and complaisant 
shareholders had all contributed to the company’s dire financial situation. It had large debts 
to both Indonesian and foreign banks all of which had failed to notice the mismanagement. 
There was also some indication that other high profile political figures were implicated in the 
fraud. The company was bailed out by new owners and the foreign creditors were prevented 
from pursuing their claims through the courts. 209 In another example in 1990, Bank Duta 
announced huge foreign exchange losses. Only one of the company officers was prosecuted 
and there was no action against the public accountant. The major controlling shareholders, 
three foundations (yayasan210) all chaired by President Suharto, made a ‘pure gift’ of USD 
419 million to bail out the bank, against all principles of corporate financing.211 The early 
1990s nonetheless saw the beginnings of merger and acquisition activity and the initial 
development of related BAPEPAM rules.  
 
                                                 
205 T.A.H. Azwar, Pandangan dan Pemikiran Masalah Perusahaan Berkaitan Dengan Hukum Perseroan 
[Views and Thoughts on Company Problems Connected to the Limited Liability Company Law], in 
SIMPOSIUM PEMBAHARUAN HUKUM DAGANG NASIONAL, TANGGAL 10-12 NOPEMBER 1980, DI 
YOGYAKARTA 104, 104 (Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional, 1984). 
206 Austin I. Pulle, The New Company Law of Indonesia, 17 COMPANY LAWYER 122 (1996). 
207 T. Mulya Lubis, PMA dan UU PMA: Harapan dan Kenyataan [Foreign Investment and the Law on Foreign 
Investment: Hopes and Realities], 11 HUKUM DAN PEMBANGUNAN 335, 336 (1981). 
208 Dasgupta & Mead, supra note 186, at 29.  
209 For more details see SCHWARZ, supra note 166, at 66-70.  
210 See Part 4.3 of this paper for discussion of the yayasan as a business entity.   
211 See Benny Tabalujan, Why Indonesian Corporate Governance Failed – Conjectures Concerning Legal 
Culture, 15 COLUMBIA J. ASIAN L. 141, 150-152 (2002).   
35 
 
A World Bank report in 1990 reviewed Indonesia’s company laws and the existing LPHN 
and Ministry of Justice drafts and recommended substantial reform of company and capital 
market regulation. 212  It particularly found that the drafts were overly regulatory (overly 
patterned on Dutch law) and suggested that this would inhibit private sector growth. 
Following this report, in 1992, USAID funded the ‘Economic Law and Improved 
Procurement Systems’ (ELIPS) Project to modernise Indonesian law. ELIPS brought in 
international legal experts, sponsored seminars and supported the drafting and dissemination 
of a new banking law,213 capital markets law214 and the 1995 company law.215 The company 
law draft was introduced in the National Legislature in May 1994 and then went through a 
committee process and was passed into law in March 1995. The parliamentary process 
resulted in a small increase in detail in the law but the underlying principles remained 
substantially the same. Interestingly, the legislature records show no mention of the role of 
ELIPS or other foreign pressure in the development of the draft.216 
The 1995 company law217 overturned articles 36–56 of the Commercial Code and the 1939 
Indigenous Joint Stock Company law. It was formally based on the ‘family principle’ of 
article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, but this appears to have been merely a formality and there 
was no real attempt to apply this principle to the new law.218 The 1995 law was clearly 
underpinned by the idea that the purpose of the corporation is maximisation of shareholder 
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value and the suggestions of wider societal objectives in the earlier drafts were abandoned. 
With 129 articles, the new law was much more comprehensive than the old. Many of the 
conventions of modern company law were covered including minority shareholder 
protections, although a comparatively high degree of state control was maintained. 
Incorporation required a minimum of two promoters, minimum capital and the approval of 
the Minister. The US influence on the drafting process resulted in provisions on piercing the 
corporate veil and new sections on mergers and acquisitions that appeared to be based on US 
concepts. 219  A number of Dutch concepts were also retained or formalised – the 
establishment of a Board of Commissioners was made compulsory and the law provided for a 
civil law-type judicial investigation of the company. A derivative action was permitted but 
was only able to be initiated by a shareholder with one tenth or more of the shares. The law 
required that capital increase and decrease could only occur with shareholder approval. For 
capital decrease, the law additionally required Ministerial approval and creditors to be 
informed. Overall, the 1995 law followed the civil law pattern of being highly mandatory 
with little scope for the reallocation of control rights by interested parties. Ministerial decrees 
in 1996 also established standard forms of articles of association,220  which limited individual 
company choice of rules.  
 
The 1995 law was welcomed by influential Indonesian commentators221 but had little time to 
take effect before the Asian Financial Crisis hit two years later. Many analysts have argued, 
with hindsight, that the new law was inadequate to the task of overcoming Indonesia’s 
entrenched corporate and banking sector problems.222 
 
2.7 The Asian Financial Crisis and the Post-Suharto Reform Era  
 
Change in Indonesian company law following the fall of Suharto in 1998 was triggered by 
the Asian Financial Crisis. Indonesia was one of the countries most affected by the crisis. It 
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has been widely argued that corporate governance laws and practices were contributing 
factors to the causes of the Asian Financial Crisis and the varying levels of economic damage 
experienced in the different countries. 223  In Indonesia more specifically the crisis was 
attributed to the long consequences of deregulation in the mid-1980s, poor corporate 
governance and critical problems with the banking sector which permitted huge unsecured 
loans merely on political recommendations.224  
Following the crisis and Suharto’s downfall, Indonesia embarked on a period of major 
political and democratisation reforms involving a ‘rush to law’.225 Much of this legal reform 
was prompted by international pressure. Prior to his resignation, Suharto had been forced to 
call in the IMF, and the IMF pushed deregulation harder and faster. Later, from 1998 to 2000 
almost every piece of national legislation passed was dictated by the IMF through the 
conditions attached to its bailout of the Indonesian economy. The National Legislature (DPR) 
passed 67 laws in less than two years, many liberalising and deregulating both politics and 
the economy and others setting up new governance institutions and courts. The IMF-led 
reforms were based on the Post-Washington Consensus model for developing counties with 
its emphasis on ‘governance’. 226  Economic law reform efforts included new laws on 
bankruptcy,227 banking, anti-monopoly, consumer protection, trade secrets, trademarks and 
copyright.228 Not all of the new laws were purely based on US/common law concepts; the 
new bankruptcy law, for instance, retained much of its Dutch heritage.229 
Indonesia’s commitments to the IMF also led to the formation of the National Committee for 
Corporate Governance (NCCG) in August 1999. This Committee was given the task of 
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drafting a corporate governance code and was provided with assistance from the World Bank. 
An initial Good Corporate Governance Code was submitted late in 1999 and was revised in 
2000, 2001, and 2006.230 The Code was intended to be a ‘reference point’ and did not impose 
mandatory rules. It generally adopted the OECD Good Corporate Governance principles and 
included recommendations on independent commissioners and audit, nomination and 
remuneration committees. Some of the major principles from the Codes, including use of 
audit committees and independent commissioners, have been formalised for listed companies 
through Jakarta Stock Exchange listing rules and BAPEPAM regulations, although there are 
still problems with implementation of these.231 Sector specific governance codes were also 
passed for SOEs in 2002 (with support of the ADB), banking in early 2004 and insurance in 
2006. The private sector itself has also undertaken various initiatives to improve corporate 
governance in Indonesia.232  
 
The IMF’s May 2000 Letter of Intent also demanded reform to the company law and the 
company registry. The revision process was delayed due to the logjam in the National 
Legislature (DPR) and to differences of opinion among those drafters who wanted 
fundamental changes and those who only wanted cosmetic changes. 233 Eventually, a draft 
prepared by the Ministry of Human Rights and Justice came before Parliament in October 
2005 and went through the committee process in February 2006.234 Consultations were held 
with various interests groups including BAPEPAM, business groups, law and business 
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faculties from leading Indonesian universities and the NGO Business Watch Indonesia.235 By 
this time the direct influence of the IMF was waning and a second US-funded ELIPS project, 
which had intended to work on company law revisions, was diverted to post-September 11 
preoccupations with criminal law and anti-money laundering.236  
 
In 2007, an amended version of the 1995 law was passed.237 In the end the 2007 law was 
presented as an update to bring it into line with other related legislation and to support good 
corporate governance efforts and hence not as a total overhaul.238 It retained most of the basic 
concepts of the 1995 law, including its formal affirmation of the Constitutional ‘family 
principle’, but generally increased the level of detail in articles and sub-articles. New 
additions in the 2007 law included that companies can have an unlimited lifespan, for creditor 
objection to mergers, provisions for the calling of extraordinary shareholder meetings and 
tightening of the discretion of the Minister on permission to incorporate. The new law also 
allowed the Board of Commissioners to temporarily dismiss directors, and gave further 
definition of directors’ duties and when a director will not be held liable for company losses.  
 
Two further changes in the 2007 law introduced elements not usually found in Western 
company law and which fall outside Pistor et al.’s emphasis on core areas of corporate law. 
Firstly, with this law (art. 74) Indonesia became the first country in the world to make 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) a mandatory legislative requirement for resources 
companies rather than being based solely around voluntarist principles. This move appears to 
have been motivated by the rise of the CSR movement in Indonesia since the early 2000s and 
then a particular confluence of political and civil society interests that wanted greater control 
of large foreign and domestic companies. 239  It was opposed by Indonesia Business Links 
(IBL) and many other individual companies who argued that mandatory CSR, understood 
mainly as the delivery of community development benefits, amounted to another tax which 
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could trigger capital removal from the country and would also create more opportunities for 
corruption. Once the law was passed, these business interests lodged an appeal in the 
Constitutional Court to have Article 74 declared unconstitutional, but lost the case. 240 
Although a piece of implementing legislation on this CSR requirement was passed in 2012,241 
there are yet to be any strong sanctions for resources companies who fail to carry out their 
CSR responsibilities which suggests that corporate power may have reasserted itself at the 
central level. In the meantime, a new trend is emerging with many districts across Indonesia 
beginning to pass their own regional laws on CSR.242   
Secondly, the 2007 law introduced the Syariah Supervisory Board (Dewan Pengawas 
Syariah) as an additional board for all syariah companies (art. 109), that is those companies 
that adhere to Islamic business principles. This board consists of one or more syariah experts 
accredited by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Ulama) and appointed by 
the general meeting of shareholders. Its function is to advise the directors and monitor 
company activities to ensure compliance with syariah principles. Committee debates on the 
2007 law show that it was the United Development Party (PPP) 243  representatives who 
pushed for the inclusion of the syariah supervisory board in the 2007 law and insisted that it 
should not form a powerless committee. 244  The records indicate that there was not any 
particular opposition to this suggestion from other parties. This development follows from the 
introduction of requirements for Syariah Supervisory Boards in syariah banks in 1992245 and 
generally increased regulation of Islamic banking in Indonesia since 1998. 246 The Jakarta 
                                                 
240 Id., at 6.  
241 Government Regulation no. 47/2012 on Social and Environmental Responsibility of Limited Liability 
Companies.  
242 For reference to this trend see: LSM Nilai Perda CSR Jadi Lahan Baru Korupsi [NGO says Regional CSR 
Laws are a New Arena for Corruption], ANTARA NEWS.COM, 13 February 2012; Wandi P. Simanullang, 
Menyoal Perda CSR [Questioning the Regional CSR Laws], HARIAN ANALISA.COM, 29 November 2011. 
243 The United Development Party (Partai Pembangunan Persatuan, PPP) was the only Islamic party permitted 
during Suharto’s New Order. The party has generally been in decline since then as it has been in competition 
with many other newly formed Islamist parties. PPP is generally a moderate Islamic party although has been 
going through an identity crisis due its drop in support. The National Legislature discussions on the 1995 
Company Law indicate that the PPP faction had suggested a Syariah Board but this was not accepted at the time. 
See SEKRETARIAT JENDERAL DEWAN PERWAKILAN RAKYAT REPUBLIK INDONESIA, supra note 
215, v. II, at 1884.  
244 Transcripts of National Legislature (DPR) Committee discussions (Risalah Rapat Panitia Khusus Rancangan 
Undang-Undang tentang Perseroan Terbatas) 22 June 2006 and 6 March 2007.  
245 Government Regulation no. 72/1992 on Banks Applying Profit Sharing Principles. See Tim Lindsey, 
Between Piety and Prudence: State Syariah and the Regulation of Islamic Banking in Indonesia, 34 SYDNEY L. 
REV 107, 114 (2012).  
246 Lindsey, supra note 245; Umar Juoro, The Development of Islamic Banking in the Post-Crisis Indonesian 
Economy, in EXPRESSING ISLAM: RELIGIOUS LIFE AND POLITICS IN INDONESIA (Greg Fealy & 
Sally White eds., 2008); Hikmahanto Juwana, Yeni Salma Barlinti & Yetty Komalasari Dewi, Sharia Law as a 
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Islamic Index (JII) was initiated on the Jakarta Stock Exchange in 2000 and various related 
regulations have since been passed.  
 
Overall, the 2007 law retained the mandatory civil law style of the earlier law of 1995 in the 
sense that parties are not given much scope to redistribute control rights. The smaller, 
incremental adjustments made, and the introduction of those new elements into the law, 
suggest that a greater degree of adaptability to changing political and economic 
circumstances has finally developed in Indonesia’s company law reform processes, although 
it is difficult to predict whether this marks the beginning of a lasting trend.  
 
3. Legal Origins, and Innovation and Stagnation in the Evolution of 
Indonesia’s Formal Company Law  
 
As outlined in the introduction to this paper, Pistor et al. in their comparative study of 
corporate law across origin and transplant countries found that transplant countries were 
likely to display some ongoing effects of ‘legal origins’ but that their rates of innovation tend 
to be significantly different to those of origin countries. They observed that transplant 
countries tend to either experience long periods of stagnation or erratic change in company 
law. This occurrence, they argue, is due to formal law in transplant country legal systems 
generally being unresponsive to political and economic change. This account of the long 
historical development of company law in Indonesia, a transplant country, broadly supports 
Pistor et al.’s framework as it relates to patterns of stagnation, but the mechanisms for 
innovation and causes of stagnation are found to be rather more complicated due to features 
of Indonesia’s legal and political history. This suggests that Pistor et al.’s category of 
‘transplant countries’ needs further refinement to take account of colonial and postcolonial 
legal history, the degree to which countries received their entire legal system as a transplant 
as well as their company law, and the specific challenges found in developing economies 
particularly weak rule of law.  
  
                                                                                                                                                        
System of Governance in Indonesia: The Development of Islamic Financial Law, 25 WIS. INT’L L. J. 773 
(2008). 
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3.1 What evidence is there of Dutch heritage and ‘legal origins’ in Indonesia’s 
formal company law?  
 
As demonstrated in Part 2 of this paper, as with the development of Indonesia’s legal system 
as a whole, formal company law change has occurred as a series of layered transplants, 247 
mainly with a base of Dutch law with some US/Western type concepts added much later.  
The Dutch Commercial Code introduced in Indonesia in 1848 certainly had very long lasting 
effects first and foremost by virtue of the fact that the substantive articles on the limited 
liability company remained in force for so long. Dutch company law concepts, such as the 
use of the Board of Commissioners, have also remained an integral part of Indonesian law 
even beyond those reforms in 1995 that were influenced by the World Bank and the US. 
Dutch heritage has also been evident in the ongoing Dutch law orientation of many 
Indonesian lawyers long past Independence. Although Indonesia did not directly follow law 
reforms in the Netherlands, for an extended period of time Dutch law remained the first and 
most obvious reference for consideration in the development of new legal models. There was 
ongoing consciousness of the fact that the Netherlands had long ago updated its laws while 
Indonesia had failed to do so. However, in the 2007 law there appears to have been little if 
any reference to Dutch models, the focus having shifted to refinement of the existing law and 
importation of OECD corporate governance principles. Thus, the degree of reference to the 
origin country has waned as the law has become more adaptive to domestic needs.   
As Pistor et al. demonstrated, transplant countries tend to follow the basic regulatory style of 
the countries from which they adopted their law. For a long time Indonesia retained the civil 
law system emphasis on codes and the notion that law on a particular subject matter should 
be exhaustively covered in one code. Courts have played little to no role in company law 
development in Indonesia. Civil law heritage also tended to result in mandatory/prescriptive 
use of legislation where there is little space for parties to reallocate decision-making rights 
within the company. This is true of Indonesia which has maintained a state-dominated and 
highly regulatory civil law approach to its company legislation. There is very little scope in 
the legislation for shareholders to opt out of the governance rules and arrange the company 
                                                 
247 See Andrew Harding, Comparative Law and Legal Transplantation in South East Asia: Making Sense of the 
“Nomic Din”, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001) (noting that 
layers of transplants are typical of the way South East Asian legal systems have developed).  
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according to their own requirements. The use of standard articles of association particularly 
limits this scope. This tendency towards mandatory regulation persisted despite the efforts in 
the early- to mid-1990s of the World Bank and the US-funded ELIPS project to push 
Indonesian policy makers towards adopting more flexible company laws. In this respect, 
some ‘legal origins’ effect is evident in Indonesia’s company law.  
 
However, as Pistor et al. predicted, it is in rates of change that Indonesia has greatly differed 
from its legal origin country. Indonesia essentially experienced almost 150 years of no major 
alteration to its central company law despite significant political and economic developments 
that alerted policy-makers to the need for change. In contrast, the Netherlands undertook 
substantial company law reforms in 1928, the early 1970s and other more recent reforms in 
response to home-grown conditions (although this is also comparatively few changes perhaps 
reflecting the fact that the Netherlands too received its company law as a transplant from the 
French). Indonesia did not replicate the changes in the Netherlands and also took a far longer 
period of time to begin to demonstrate a greater level of responsiveness in its company law to 
political and economic developments – a process which has occurred to some extent in the 
years following the Asian Financial Crisis. It may be that part of the reason Indonesia 
displayed a more exaggerated pattern of stagnation than the other transplant countries studied 
by Pistor et al. is because it is essentially a transplant of a transplant, and there were fewer 
legal updates in the Netherlands that might have inspired imitation in Indonesia particularly 
during the colonial era.248  
It should also be recalled that what Indonesia inherited was not Dutch law as such, but Dutch 
colonial law. In particular, the complex and unwieldy race-based plural legal system put in 
place during the Dutch colonial regime certainly had long repercussions past Independence 
including in Indonesia’s company law. One product of that plural system, the 1939 
Indigenous Joint Stock Company Law, was effectively ignored as law users chose the NV 
company form that they preferred for its ‘international’ connotations. Nonetheless, 
Indonesian law makers struggled for a long time to reconcile the plural legal underpinnings of 
the laws inherited from the Dutch colonial regime with the new nation-state that they wanted 
to create. The ongoing influence of the plural legal system in Indonesia may be better 
                                                 
248 In contrast British colonies such as India and the Straits Settlements more regularly followed updates to the 
UK Companies Act. See RADHE SHYAM RUNGTA, THE RISE OF BUSINES CORPORATIONS IN INDIA 
1851-1900 (1970) (describing the history of company law in India during the colonial period).  
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characterised as a colonial legal history effect rather than ‘legal origins’ or ‘legal family’ per 
se.  
3.2 What factors have generated innovation in Indonesia’s formal company law?  
 
The main innovations in Indonesia’s company law over its history have involved significantly 
different sets of political and economic interest groups, ranging from indigenous 
entrepreneurs and colonial policy-makers behind the 1939 law, to the foreign investors who 
pushed for the 1971 amendment to voting rules, and the international mobile investors and 
technocrats involved in the 1995 law. The 2007 law was initially driven by the IMF 
conditions on its post-Asian Financial Crisis bailout of the Indonesian economy, but the 
contents of the law largely reflected shifts in domestic interests. It is notable that there were 
policy-makers or other parties involved at some point in each of the 1939, 1995 and 2007 
company laws who shared the goal of ‘social and economic engineering through law’ – 
colonial policy-makers, USAID and the ELIPS project, and the IMF. These were all ‘outside’ 
players in the sense that they were not direct users of the company law.  
Strengthening of institutional legal capacity was in some evidence for the 1995 law (through 
the US sponsored ELIPS project and its assistance with drafting), but was far more apparent 
in the 2007 law which was enacted under the new parliamentary processes introduced in 
Indonesia in the early 2000s. It was these more democratic procedures that probably enabled 
the greater degree of adaptability to changing domestic political and economic circumstances 
evidenced in the 2007 law.  
Company law reform is often triggered by financial crises in different jurisdictions,249 and 
crisis has certainly played a role in Indonesia. The smaller corporate crises in the early 1990s 
did not result in immediate legal reforms but were settled politically, and it took the influence 
of the Asian Financial Crisis on the whole economy to eventually bring about change to 
Indonesia’s company law.   
                                                 
249 For example, the collapse of Enron and the resulting Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the United States has 
generated much academic analysis, see, e.g. CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND 
CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008), at Ch. 3; Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory 
Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2003); John C. 
Coffee Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POL’Y 198 (2005).    
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It is also clear from the evidence presented here that company law reforms in Indonesia, or 
attempted reforms, have also been aimed at keeping up appearances as much as, or even more 
than, the felt need to regulate the activities of companies in a different way. Post-
independence company law drafts were motivated more by the desire to modernise and 
Indonesian-ise the inherited colonial legal system than to necessarily change corporate 
practices. The 1995 company law and the post-Asian Financial Crisis adoption of the OECD 
corporate governance principles also seem to have been at least partly driven by the need to 
keep up appearances, to symbolise modernity, and to meet international legal standards. This 
role for company law falls outside the Pistor et al. framework with its emphasis on core 
functions of corporate law although the ‘signalling’ function of company law has been noted 
in more recent work.250 
3.3 What factors have inhibited change in Indonesia’s formal company law?  
 
Pistor et al.’s explanation for long periods of legal stagnation observed in transplant countries 
is that formal law tends to be unresponsive to political and economic change and to a lack of 
process of creative destruction of law. This explanation holds broadly true for the long period 
in which Indonesia’s company law did not change. The detailed historical study of Indonesia 
undertaken here has revealed that there have been many and changing reasons for this lack of 
reform, most of which can be linked to the incapacity of the system to adapt to changing 
domestic circumstances. Indonesia’s legal system has been beset by ongoing institutional 
problems, including the enduring effects of the colonial plural legal system. However, leftist 
political and economic ideologies, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, also promoted 
alternative business forms apparently at the expense of company law reform.   
  
Firstly, as noted, it took the Netherlands itself some 90 years to amend its Commercial Code 
articles on the NV, which meant that during Indonesia’s colonial period there was only the 
one update that might have inspired change. It is then largely unexplained as to why the 
colonial regime failed to follow the reforms undertaken to the provisions on the NV in the 
Netherlands in 1928 and the Concordance Principle. It is clear that the colonial legislature 
had the capacity to pass the required reform as evidenced by other contemporaneous 
revisions of the Commercial Code, but either the imitatory machinery was simply too slow or 
policy makers deliberately chose not to follow the lead of the origin country.   
                                                 
250 See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 249, at 34-35. 
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Then, following Independence, the felt requirement to revise the Commercial Code as a 
whole rather than a section at a time inhibited change. This civil law inheritance of emphasis 
on codes proved too difficult an endeavour for legal drafters in the newly independent nation 
with its weak institutional legal drafting expertise and the overriding political imperatives of 
the time. Legal drafters were unable to move quickly enough to bring draft laws all the way 
to enactment as regimes and objectives changed around them. The desire to graft indigenous 
Indonesian concepts such as musyawarah and mufakat (consensus decision-making) and 
gotong-royong (mutual assistance) onto the Dutch company law foundations also proved too 
difficult and held up the reform process. The difficulties with the Commercial Code were 
compounded by the complexity of the plural legal system inherited from the Dutch colonial 
regime and the impossibility of unravelling it to the satisfaction of all interest groups. This 
indicates a colonial ‘legal history’ effect on company law stagnation in Indonesia that is 
distinct from that of ‘legal family’.  
During the New Order, despite repeated recognition that company law reform was needed, 
change was stymied through bureaucratic infighting and the clash in priorities between the 
US-trained economist technocrats and the Dutch law oriented legal drafters in the Ministry of 
Justice. The need for formal law change was postponed through the actions of the Ministry of 
Justice in controlling articles of association through the incorporation process. Later, in the 
post-Suharto era, difficulties with the logjam of bills in Parliament and the far greater role for 
civil society in law-making held up reforms.  Indonesia has also been generally characterised 
by almost a total lack of shareholder or public activism with regards to company law – 
probably due to concentrated shareholding and general public apathy with regards to formal 
law, although this has changed somewhat in the post-Suharto era. This lack of demand for 
law reform by law users is clearly a further factor behind Indonesia’s long period of 
stagnation.  
In Pistor et al.’s paper the company form is assumed to be ideologically neutral and as the 
natural vehicle for business organisation. However, political and economic ideology has 
played a significant role in formal commercial law reform in Indonesia. The shifting policy 
emphasis on the role of the private sector in the economy was a further factor in the 
stagnation of Indonesia’s company law. Indonesian policy-makers initiated change in other 
related areas of law when there was the political will to do so, which suggests that ‘inability 
of the legal system to innovate’ was not the whole story. The dominance of leftist ideology 
during the post-Independence and Sukarno years produced a decided preference for 
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cooperatives and SOEs as legal forms for economic development. Both the cooperatives law 
and the state-owned enterprises law went through a number of major legislative changes 
during the period that company law was essentially stagnant. The following table of major 
legislative reforms in the three areas of law demonstrates this more clearly:  
Table 1: Major Legislative Changes in Company, Cooperative and State-Owned Enterprises Laws in Indonesia 
Company Laws Cooperatives Laws SOE Laws 
1848 (S. 23/1847) 1915 (S. 431/1915) 1927 (S. 419/1927)251  
1939 (S. 569/1939) 1927 (S. 91/1927)  1955 (Law no. 12/1955)  
1995 (Law no. 1/1995) 1933 (S. 108/1933) 1960 (Law no. 19/1960) 
2007 (Law no. 40/2007) 1949 (S. 179/1949)  1969 (Law no. 9/1969) 
 1958 (Law no. 79/1958) 2003 (Law no. 19/2003) 
1965 (Law no. 14/1965)   
1967 (Law no. 12/1967) 
1992 (Law no. 25/1992)  
[2012] a draft law is 
currently under discussion 
 
This is not to say that the cooperatives and SOEs laws were necessarily successful as legal 
vehicles for economic development, but that formal law reform in these areas was simply 
given higher priority than company law reform at particular junctures in Indonesia’s history. 
This possibility of choice of alternative business forms is rarely acknowledged in the 
academic debates around company law development.   
3.4 Is There Evidence of ‘Complementary Control Mechanisms’ in Indonesia’s 
Company Law?  
 
Pistor et al. found that complementary control mechanisms, or additional protections for 
shareholders, including exit rights, judicial protection, tend not to have developed in 
transplant countries due to lower levels of adaptability and limited scope for experimentation.  
In Indonesia, with its state-dominated and highly mandatory style to its formal company law 
there has certainly been little opportunity for experimentation, although some of these 
mechanisms have nonetheless been created. Prior to 1995, the Ministry of Justice was making 
changes through the incorporation process, but this was aimed more at state control than at 
developing shareholder protections. In the 1995 law, some of the mechanisms listed by Pistor 
et al. were introduced, including shareholder appraisal rights in the case of mergers, 
                                                 
251 For the sake of general comparison, this refers to the Indische Bedrijvenwet of 1927 (Staatsblad no. 
419/1927), and not the Comptabiliteit Wet of 1925 (Staatsblad no. 448/1925) which also enabled some state-
owned enterprises but was used less often than the Indische Bedrijvenwet. See supra note 52.    
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shareholders’ right to a derivative action against company management, and the ability to 
request a judicial investigation of the company. These mechanisms were introduced not 
through experimentation but by transplant of international notions of best practice, and there 
has been little evidence of their use in practice.252  
 
Pistor et al. find that securities regulation, another form of complementary control mechanism, 
has made important recent advances in some transplant countries.253 This is generally true of 
Indonesia, which although it saw the establishment of earlier stock exchanges, securities 
regulation really only began to develop in the 1990s and has since been strengthened 
following the Asian Financial Crisis. There is now a body of listing rules and BAPEPAM 
regulations which are updated more regularly than Indonesia’s formal company law.  
 
The evidence for Indonesia hence generally substantiates Pistor et al.’s predictions on the 
lack of development of complementary control mechanisms in transplant countries. However, 
while not ‘complementary’ in the formal law sense intended by Pistor et al., it is clear that 
informal modes of company regulation, particularly based around family hierarchies, have 
been very important in Indonesia. The following section extends the discussion of formal 
company law development in Indonesia to consider the role of informal regulation.  
 
4. The Corporate Form in Reality in Indonesia and Further Perspectives on 
Legal Innovation and Stagnation 
 
For Pistor et al. a high rate of incremental innovation in corporate law is a strong factor in 
determining the efficacy of law in supporting economic development. Conversely, low rates 
of company law innovation may hamper capital development. To this point, the analysis has 
dealt primarily with the changes in the statutory company law in Indonesia. This followed the 
approach adopted by Pistor et al. in their comparative study (although they did recognise its 
limitations).254 However, Indonesia has been plagued by ‘rule of law’ deficiencies with lack 
of enforcement, corruption, weak legal institutions, low expectations of courts, and 
                                                 
252 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 222, at 5 (noting that at the time (1998) there was no published case of a 
shareholder suing a company director, although compilations of cases at the time were sketchy). A search of 
Mahkamah Agung (Indonesia’s highest court) reported decisions (since 2007) appear to indicate some increased 
use of the courts by shareholders, but there are no available statistics on this.   
253 Pistor et al., supra note 2, at 859.  
254 Pistor et al., supra note 2, at 795.  
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bureaucratic decision-making has long been able to trump law on the books.255 Indonesia also 
has a vast array of non-statutory mechanisms for social and economic regulation which 
generally affect larger proportions of the population than is reached by formal law. Law in 
Indonesia has tended to be contingent on circumstances, and forum shopping between state 
law, adat and Islam,256 or avoiding courts altogether has been common.257 It is also clear that 
confidence in the importance of formal law has waxed and waned over time through the 
various post-Independence regimes and then into the post-1998 reform era and its ‘rush to 
law’. Although not studied extensively, there is existing literature relating to both the lack of 
effectiveness of Indonesia’s formal company law and to the development of business entities 
outside the formal law system.  
Recognition of the importance of informal modes of business regulation, especially in 
developing countries, is not, of course, a particularly new insight. Milhaupt and Pistor (2008), 
for example, note that law is not the only mechanism that regulates economic activity and 
some countries have thriving economies without being underpinned by the rule of law. 
Further, the existence of informal rules and non-legal governance mechanisms may affect the 
demand for formal law. 258 In other words, if law users are content with informal modes of 
regulation then they are unlikely to lobby for formal law change.  
The following discussion presents evidence of the effectiveness of Indonesia’s formal 
company law, the role of bureaucratic directives, the development of autonomous business 
forms and regulation in the informal sector, and discusses how this material contributes to 
understanding the evolution of company law in Indonesia. This evidence raises questions 
about the emphasis on formal law innovation in Pistor et al.’s analytical framework as it 
particularly relates to developing countries. Restricting the scope of analysis to formal 
company law in these countries may result in overlooking the importance of the relationship 
                                                 
255 See, e.g., Simon Butt & Tim Lindsey, Judicial Mafia: The Courts and State Illegality in Indonesia, in THE 
STATE AND ILLEGALITY IN INDONESIA 189, footnote 8 (Edward Aspinall & Gerry van Klinken eds., 
2011).  
256 For accounts of forum shopping in Indonesia, see JOHN BOWEN, ISLAM, LAW AND EQUALITY IN 
INDONESIA: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF PUBLIC REASONING (2003); Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, 
Forum Shopping and Shopping Forums: Dispute Processing in a Minangkabau Village in West Sumatra, 19 J. 
LEGAL PLURALISM 117 (1981); Erman Rajagukguk, Legal Pluralism and the Three-Cornered Case Study of 
Women’s Inheritance Rights Changing in Lombok, in LEGITIMACY, LEGAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
CHANGE: LAW AND MODERNIZATION RECONSIDERED 213 (David K. Linnan ed., 2012).  
257 David K. Linnan, ‘Reading the Tea Leaves’ in the Indonesian Commercial Court: A Cautionary Tale, but for 
Whom? in NEW COURTS IN ASIA 56 (Andrew Harding & Penelope (Pip) Nicholson eds., 2010) (noting the 
tendency of private parties to avoid the courts in Indonesia particularly during the New Order era). 
258 MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 249, at 11; Curtis J. Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin: Rethinking Law’s 
Relationship to the Economy – Implications for Policy, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 831, 835 (2009).  
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between practice and formal law change and the existence of innovative substitutes for 
formal law.  It also suggests that Pistor et al.’s category of ‘transplant’ countries is too wide 
to wholly encompass the differences between developing and developed countries and the 
degree to which informal regulatory mechanisms exert influence on the path of company law 
development in different countries.   
4.1 The Effectiveness of Formal Company Law in Indonesia 
 
It has long been noted that company practices in Indonesia have diverged considerably from 
the law on the books. Such comments are quite consistent across older studies of company 
law 259 and in the mostly post-Asian Financial Crisis ‘corporate governance’ literature. 260 
Older studies observed that the law was used to enable company formation and enhance 
social status but rarely had much regulatory influence on internal management procedures.261 
These studies note that companies have been primarily established to attract credit and 
government contracts rather than to accumulate capital. Company and private funds were 
often mixed with directors and shareholders often preferring to pay debts out of their own 
pockets rather than allow the company to go bankrupt, and management practices rarely 
followed legal procedures.262 Kaehlig (1986) went so far as to argue that Western company 
law in Indonesia was useless because it did not accord with practice and hence should be 
abandoned.263  
The corporate governance literature on Indonesia has emphasised the high degree of 
concentrated ownership of companies, retained family control of listed companies, and the 
close interrelationship between favoured businessmen (often of Chinese descent) and the 
state under the Suharto regime. 264  Concentrated family ownership increased during the 
1980s. 265  Claessens et al. (2000) calculated that more than two-thirds of publicly listed 
                                                 
259 CATOR, supra note 41; Makarim, supra note 43; KAEHLIG, supra note 24; S. Pompe, Small Enterprises 
and Company Law in Indonesia: A Study of the Limited Liability Company in Indonesian Commercial Practice, 
148 BIJDRAGEN TOT DE TAAL-, LAND- EN VOLKENKUNDE 67 (1992).  
260 Tabalujan, supra note 211; Rosser, supra note 203; Fitzpatrick, supra note 225; Rajeswary Ampalavanar 
Brown, Indonesian Corporations, Cronyism and Corruption, 40 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 953 (2006); World Bank 
and IMF, Report on Observance of Standards and Codes, Corporate Governance Country Assessment, Republic 
of Indonesia, August 2004.   
261 Pompe, supra note 259, at 72; KAEHLIG, supra note 24.  
262 Pompe, supra note 259; KAEHLIG, supra note 24; CATOR, supra note 41 (on Chinese companies in the 
Netherlands Indies). 
263 KAEHLIG, supra note 24, at 284. Kaehlig’s findings are also summarised in Pompe, supra note 259.  
264 Fitzpatrick, supra note 222.  
265 Rosser, supra note 202, at 334.  
51 
 
companies in Indonesia were in family hands while only 0.6% were widely-held. 266 
Indonesia’s conglomerates, despite their size and diversity, have been primarily run as family 
businesses with family members often appointed to positions on the boards of directors and 
commissioners.267 Tabalujan (2002) indicated several instances where members of family-
owned companies acted to aid another family member and even accepted punishment in order 
to save face when there was no legal basis for it.268 Due to the post-Asian Financial Crisis 
law reforms, Indonesia has been awarded improving scores on comparative corporate 
governance indicators. 269  Certainly in the post-New Order era there has been some 
weakening of old political patronage networks due to the decentralisation of power to the 
regions and an increase in watchdog and civil society activities. 270 However, analysts have 
generally been quite sceptical that the post-Asian Financial Crisis law reforms, especially 
where they involve transplantation of Western concepts, will bring about true change to 
practices.271 There are still many problems with weak law enforcement in the Indonesian 
system generally, and there is yet little evidence of radical changes to the underlying 
ownership structure or to family control of listed and private companies in Indonesia.   
 
It is clear on this evidence that the links between formal company law and corporate practice 
have been tenuous in Indonesia, and that this trend is true across differently sized businesses 
and through different historical periods.  Pistor et al. point to the lack of responsiveness of 
formal law reform to political and economic reality in transplant countries. This is certainly 
true, but effectiveness of the law must also be acknowledged as a critical element in 
developmental pathways in countries with weaker formal legal systems. If there is little 
expectation that the law will be effective then it is more unlikely that law-users will demand 
formal law change. If informal regulation (such as kinship ties) can provide sufficient trust in 
business arrangements, again, there will be a lower demand for law reform.  
 
                                                 
266 Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control in East 
Asian Countries, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 103 (2000).  
267 Rosser, supra note 203, at 334; Yuri Sato, The Salim Group in Indonesia: The Development and Behaviour 
of the Largest Conglomerate in South East Asia, 31 DEVELOPING ECON. 408 (1993). 
268 Tabalujan, supra note 211.   
269 World Bank and IMF, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), Corporate Governance 
Country Assessment, Republic of Indonesia, August 2004 and April 2010.  
270See Christian Chua, Capitalist Consolidation, Consolidated Capitalists: Indonesia’s Conglomerates between 
Authoritarianism and Democracy, in DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA 201 (Marco 
Bünte & Andreas Ufen eds., 2009). 
271 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick. supra note 225; Fitzpatrick, supra note 231; Rosser, supra note 203.    
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Acknowledgement of the historical weaknesses in company law enforcement also reinforces 
the evidence for the argument made above that formal law change in Indonesia has often 
been for appearances sake, and that formal company law has played aspirational, symbolic or 
signalling272 roles often tied up with the goal of supplying legitimacy to the state. That is, 
formal law appears to play other roles alongside any true regulatory aims whether or not 
wholly intended by law makers. This certainly falls outside Pistor et al.’s framework with its 
focus on core areas of corporate law and the allocation of control rights within the company.  
 
4.2 Bureaucratic Directives 
 
A focus on legislation may overlook the role of bureaucratic directives in economic 
regulation, particularly where the state is dominated by the executive and the legislature is 
weak. Bureaucratic decisions may substitute for, or override, formal laws. Particularly during 
the New Order period, much of Indonesian commercial regulation resided in government 
policy and not in formal written laws. 273  This included the use of Ministerial Decrees, 
circular letters and also commonly bureaucratic decision making without any formal public 
announcement. As noted above in Section 2.6, during the New Order era, prior to the passing 
of the 1995 company law, the Ministry of Justice at least partially filled the regulatory 
vacuum in company law by controlling the content of articles of association of new 
companies. In doing so, the Ministry was postponing the need for formal company law 
reform, and was doing so in a way that was responsive to changing circumstances without 
being hampered by legislative hurdles. This example indicates that innovation may be 
occurring elsewhere even when the formal law on the books remains unaltered.  
4.3 ‘Autonomous’274 or Non-Formal Law Types of Business Form 
 
The mismatch between formal law and practice in company law in Indonesia has also 
occurred with the emergence of different business forms outside the law on the books. These 
entities have developed with varying degrees of formality and linkages with bureaucratic and 
notarial practices.  
                                                 
272 See MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 249, at 34-35.  
273 Timothy C. Lindsey, Paradigms, Paradoxes and Possibilities: Towards Understandings of Indonesia’s Legal 
System, in ASIAN LAWS THROUGH AUSTRALIAN EYES, 90, 101 (Veronica Taylor ed., 1997).  
274 Term adopted from KAEHLIG, supra note 24.  
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There were originally adat business forms, 275 although these were generally dismissed by 
Western commentators as failing to formalise legal personhood and the liability of 
members.276 As noted in Section 2.1 above, the Chinese kongsi form originally developed 
outside of any formal law, although was eventually brought within the colonial legal system. 
The Commission on Indigenous Legal Persons reported in 1931 that many indigenous 
businesses and associations were operating without any type of formal Dutch legal 
personality. 277  
 
In 1991, the BPHN conducted a survey of notaries to find out what kinds of notarial deeds 
that they produced. The notaries said that they had assisted with the establishment of various 
different business forms including the various partnership forms found in the Commercial 
Code, different variations on the PT (PT. Familie (Family companies), PMDN (Domestic 
Investment Companies), PMA (Foreign Investment Companies), PT Persero (State-owned 
limited liability Companies)), but also some forms without formal legal basis such as 
perusahaan dagang (trading company), usaha dagang (trading business), perusahaan 
perorangan (sole proprietorship), and pemborong bangunan (building contractor). 278 The 
report concluded that something needed to be done to bring all these different business forms 
within the formal law system.   
 
Pompe (1991) in a study of small commercial ventures in Surabaya found ‘toko’ (shop) and 
‘usaha dagang’ forms being used extensively.  Pompe found evidence that the usaha dagang 
form had most likely originated in the 1960s when anti-Chinese discrimination was strong 
and Chinese businesses could not get permission to form PTs, while toko and kongsi forms 
were avoided as being too obviously Chinese. Notaries developed standard deeds for the 
establishment of usaha dagang and these had to be registered with the Ministry for Trade. As 
Pompe points out, the Commercial Code did not actually close off the possibility of other 
business forms being used – it merely set out possible options.279 Manopo (1984) also noted 
                                                 
275 See supra note 23.  
276 See, e.g., Zeylemaker, supra note 24; VAN DER BIJ, supra note 66, at ch. II.   
277 VERSLAG VAN DE COMMISSIE VOOR INLANDSCHE RECHTSPERSONEN, supra note 78, at 27-34. 
278 KUSWANTYO TAMI HARYONO, LAPORAN AKHIR PENELITIAN PERKEMBANGAN BENTUK 
BADAN USAHA DI INDONESIA [FINAL REPORT ON INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF BUSINESS ENTITIES IN INDONESIA] (1991).  
279 S. Pompe, The Usaha Dagang; A Commercial Venture within Indonesian State Law, 147 BIJDRAGEN TOT 
DE TAAL-, LAND-, EN VOLKENKUNDE 485 (1991).  
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that business entities (‘badan usaha’) often acted as limited liability companies before 
obtaining permission from the Ministry of Justice.280  
 
Another business form that gained notoriety during the New Order era was the yayasan 
(stichting or foundation). Although these were nominally charitable institutions, they were 
used as a category of state enterprise and were extensively utilised by the Suharto family to 
siphon off state funds and to buy votes for the ruling party Golkar. 281 The yayasan apparently 
loosely originated in the Dutch stichting practice,282 but developed over time according to 
unwritten law and custom and some jurisprudence. 283  Yayasan were not used for profit 
seeking before independence, but afterwards they have been used as a business form.284 
Yayasan were not subject to auditing or taxation and were an ideal way to hide personal 
wealth. In response to pressure from the IMF to prevent misuses of the yayasan form, a law 
was passed in 2001 to specifically redefine it as a charitable organisation with auditing 
requirements for larger yayasan and for those that receive government assistance.285 Almost 
90% of Indonesia’s NGOs are now formed as yayasan. 286 
 
Consideration of informal modes of business regulation in Indonesia demonstrates that the 
legislature has not held exclusive rights to initiating legal change. The evidence presented 
above shows private actors finding niches for themselves that are acceptable to the 
bureaucracy and thereby creating new business forms. These informal modes have more 
obviously responded to the needs of entrepreneurs and thus probably lessened any desire for 
formal company law reform.    
  
                                                 
280 Manopo, supra note 108, at 90.  
281 Alberto D. Hanani, Indonesian Business Groups: The Crisis in Progress, in BUSINESS GROUPS IN EAST 
ASIA: FINANCIAL CRISIS, RESTRUCTURING AND NEW GROWTH 179, 188 (Sea-Jin Chang ed., 2006).  
282 The stichting was not given legal recognition in the Netherlands until 1954, and in 1956 was included in the 
Netherlands Civil Code.  
283 HIMAWAN & KUSUMAATMADJA, supra note 188, at 77. This statement is also found in the elucidation 
in the Law no. 16/2001 on Yayasan. See also Simorangkir, supra note 156, at 5 (noting that the LPHN produced 
a draft yayasan law sometime between 1958 and 1965).  
284 Manopo, supra note 108, at 88.    
285 Law no. 16/2001 on Yayasan as amended by Law no. 28/2004.  See also: Samiul Hasan & Jenny Onyx, 
Governance Approach in Asia’s Third Sector: Adapted Western or Modified Asian?  in COMPARATIVE 
THIRD SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: STRUCTURE, PROCESS AND POLITICAL ECONOMY, 193, 
197 (Samiul Hasan & Jenny Onyx ed., 2008).  
286 Maria R Nindita Radyati, Third Sector Organisation Governance in Indonesia: Regulations, Initiatives and 
models, in COMPARATIVE THIRD SECTOR GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: STRUCTURE, PROCESS AND 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 253 (Samiul Hasan & Jenny Onyx ed., 2008).  
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4.4 The Informal Business Sector in Indonesia 
 
It should also be noted that in Indonesia’s informal economy legal business forms are largely 
ignored altogether. The Indonesian Bureau of Statistics makes a clear distinction in its 
economic data collection between businesses that are ‘legal entities’ (berbadan hukum) and 
those that are not. Legal entities are defined as SOEs, public and private companies, 
partnerships, cooperatives, yayasan and ‘other’ which apparently covers the usaha dagang. 
Based on 2006 data, the Bureau estimates that 1.3 million businesses or 10.25% are 
established as legal entities, while the remainder have no legal standing at all.287 Businesses 
with legal entity status are predominately (with more than 25%) found in electricity, gas and 
water, construction, transport, warehouses, communication, health and education services. 
There are smaller proportions of legal entity businesses in the manufacturing, trade, hotel and 
restaurant sectors (between 3.44% and 8.04%). It is variously estimated that Indonesia’s 
informal sector contributes between 19-38% of national GDP and that this proportion has 
changed over time.288 More precise data from 2010 show provincial variation; the informal 
sector (defined as an absence of legal entity status) represented 37% of GDP in the cultural 
centre of Yogyakarta but only 27% in the much more industrialised province of Banten.289 
Business entities in the informal sector tend to be regulated through a ‘moral economy’ of 
kinship obligations and informal cooperation, although may also be characterised by forms of 
social and sometimes physical domination of some groups and individuals by others.290   
 
The existence of the large informal economy where legal entity status is irrelevant is a further 
factor in lessening public interest in and demand for formal company law reform.  It is clear 
that formal law is not necessarily a prerequisite for business activity.  Further, it appears that 
                                                 
287 BADAN PUSAT STATISTIK, PROFIL PERUSAHAAN BERBADAN HUKUM [PROFILE OF 
COMPANIES WITH LEGAL ENTITY STATUS] (2006). See also, BADAN PUSAT STATISTIK, PROFIL 
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290 See, e.g., Hans-Dieter Evers & Ozay Mehmet, The Management of Risk: Informal Trade in Indonesia, 22 
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the legal divide between European and native businesses that was created during the colonial 
era is mirrored in the modern statistics that show around 90% of Indonesian businesses 
operating without any legal entity status. Colonial heritage, and the long historical effects of 
the plural legal system where a large proportion the society and economy was outside the 
state law system, has arguably had deep path dependent effects. Thus, as noted previously, in 
Indonesia there has been a strong continuing influence of colonial ‘legal history’ in 
determining the legal development and practical implementation of the company form that is 
distinct from ‘legal family’ or ‘legal origins’.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This paper has charted in detail the processes of legal evolution of the corporate form as it 
has developed through the periods of Indonesian history. Seeking chiefly to understand the 
almost 150 year hiatus in reform to Indonesia’s main company law and the pathways that it 
has since taken, this paper found that Pistor et al.’s broad analytical framework offers very 
useful insights into how transplant countries may follow different trajectories of development 
compared with the countries where their legal systems and company laws originated. While 
Indonesia has retained some Dutch formal company law concepts and style, it has had a 
significantly different pattern of change to that of the Netherlands. Indonesia’s low rate of 
formal company law change and its more recent home-grown innovations provide evidence 
against the ‘legal origins’ theory and its assumptions about essential similarities between 
jurisdictions belonging to a single legal family.   
 
In considering the case of Indonesia, the study has extended Pistor et al.’s framework in two 
key ways. Firstly, through use of close historical detail, it has revealed features of company 
law development that fall outside Pistor et al.’s observations of formal legal change, 
including the long-term path dependency effects of the colonial plural legal system on the 
corporate form, competing ideological emphases on cooperatives and SOEs laws, and the 
non-regulatory or aspirational roles that company law has represented. Secondly, through 
consideration of informal regulatory mechanisms the analysis was extended to taking account 
of the relationship between the formal and informal systems and questioned Pistor et al.’s 
emphasis on formal law innovation as being the critical factor in development of the 
company form.  
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These extensions of the analysis indicated that Pistor et al.’s division of ‘origin’ and 
‘transplant’ countries is perhaps too generalised to take account of the development of the 
corporate form and company law in Indonesia. Transplant countries which are also post-
colonial states with developing economies and weak rule of law may display additional 
complexities in the pathways that company law development takes through time that are not 
directly connected to the original legal transplant. Further research into the historical 
development of company law in developing countries, might also fruitfully take a similar 
widened approach to Pistor et al.’s framework. The Philippines, for example, experienced 
little change to its company legislation between 1906 and 1980, while Malaysia was also 
identified by Pistor et al. as having experienced long periods of stagnation. These two 
neighbouring countries would make very useful comparisons with Indonesia given their 
differing legal families and colonial histories. Such detailed comparative research might cast 
further light on why certain countries might experience long periods of stagnation in 
company law reform and on the pathways of subsequent developments.  
 
